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This dissertation develops a unified framework for studying political contestation in
advanced industrial democracies. It contests a notion widely held in the literature that polit-
ical parties continuously change their policy positions, arguing instead that parties are ide-
ologically quite constrained at the dimensional level. Building on insights from a variety of
literatures, including spatial modeling and sociology, it advances a novel theory that accounts
for the role of salience for party change by distinguishing between a party’s primary and sec-
ondary dimension.
The first study shows that a party’s reputation and long-term ideological commitments
limit positional flexibility on its more salient dimension, while short-term strategic policy
shifts are possible on issues outside of its core agenda. The second study explores a party’s
incentives to obscure its policy preferences on certain issues. It analyzes how party leaders de-
liberately create uncertainty about where their party stands on the issue of European integra-
tion. It shows that three distinct blurring strategies—avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation—
all increase expert uncertainty about party positions, but that their effectiveness is conditioned
by party-level characteristics. The third study further enhances our understanding of second
dimension politics by examining the variation in the economic positions of European region-
alist parties. It uses a combination of public opinion and expert-level data on voter and party
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The study of party strategy and political contestation is moving in an exciting new
direction. Until recently, much of the literature in this field retained a parsimonious, but artifi-
cial, unidimensional view of party competition. Increasingly, however, scholars have begun to
embrace the inherent complexity and dynamism of the ideological landscape in which parties
compete for votes. This dissertation follows this new perspective and deals with the complica-
tions of multidimensional democratic representation head on. In particular, it presents a series
of chapters that enrich our understanding of party competition with insights from more histor-
ical, sociological approaches, all the while generating empirical predictions that are compati-
ble with, and directly contribute to, the mainstream literature on party behavior.
The first chapter, entitled “A Change of Heart?,” provides a stepping-stone for the sub-
sequent dissertation papers, and develops a novel framework that intimately connects party
strategy to the relative importance, or salience, of political issues and dimensions. The domi-
nant view of party competition has long been that political parties continuously and strategi-
cally alter their policy positions at a dimensional level. At the same time, however, scholars
have stressed the historical stability of European party systems, as they reflect deeply-rooted
socio-economic divisions in society. This chapter provides one of the first attempts to recon-
cile these two perspectives.
It argues that we need to understand how political parties compete on multiple ideo-
logical dimensions that are not all equally important to them, and how this may affect their
behavior. Specifically, by distinguishing between a party’s primary and secondary dimension,
we can analyze both the short-term strategic behavior of parties in their effort to win elections
and the constraints they face from long-term ideological commitments. I develop a theory of
positional stability and change that relies on issue salience to predict whether a party is likely
to change its appeals. Using cross-sectional time series analysis of party positions and a novel
measure of the relative salience of an ideological dimension, I show that a party’s reputation
and durable ties with its supporters on its more salient dimension limit positional flexibility,
while strategic policy shifts are possible on issues outside of its core agenda. This finding not
only has important implications for our general understanding of democratic representation, it
also predicts why new challenger parties face fewer ideological constraints than mainstream
parties when altering their appeals in response to the changing preferences of the electorate.
In the second chapter, “Disentangling Blurring,” I explore the interplay between mul-
tidimensionality and salience by arguing that parties may, at times, have a strategic incentive
to avoid taking clear policy positions at all. Although scholars typically assume that position
avoidance is costly, I argue that it could be a viable strategy for a party looking to alleviate
potential disagreement among internal party factions or with supporters, especially on issues
outside of its main agenda. Building on a growing literature on position blurring, I propose
that parties can obfuscate their positions by means of three strategies: avoidance, ambigu-
ity, and alternation. I map a party’s strategy by analyzing the content of its manifesto. Re-
sults across 14 Western European countries from 1999 to 2017 confirm that all three blurring
strategies produce expert uncertainty on the issue of European integration, but that their effec-
tiveness is conditioned by a series of party-level characteristics. This chapter has fundamental
implications for our understanding of party strategy. In particular, it sheds light on how parties
try to manipulate the dimensional structure of party competition.
Finally, a third chapter, “United in Diversity,” explores parties’ behavior on their less
salient, secondary dimension in more detail by studying European regionalist parties. Despite
their recent successes in Catalonia and Scotland, for example, our understanding of these ac-
tors is limited. Existing theories do not explain how a regionalist party develops an economic
platform that falls outside of its autonomist agenda. As political authority is increasingly relo-
cated to the subnational level, away from national governments, it is vital to analyze the ide-
ological positions of the main political drivers behind this push for increased regional auton-
omy. I formulate the following hypotheses: (1) regionalist parties will initially avoid the eco-
nomic left-right dimension, (2) their positions will be more ideologically flexible than those
policy positions related to the center-periphery divide, and (3) their eventual positions will re-
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flect the ideological complexion of their regions. I use both public opinion and expert-level
data on voter and party positions to test these theoretical predictions. I find that the relative
economic left-right position of the regional voter as compared to the nationwide electorate is
an important determinant of regionalist parties’ economic positions. This study breaks new
ground by evaluating the quality of democratic representation in a time when regional identity
continues to inform the preferences of voters and parties alike, especially because regionalist
parties will play a pivotal role in shaping the economic policies of the regions they represent.
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CHAPTER 2: STABILITY AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN PARTY POSITIONS
Political parties are the crucial mediator between citizens and their government. In
order to properly relay the preferences of their supporters, parties ought to be responsive to
changes in public opinion and update their programs accordingly. Undeniably, representa-
tive democracy implies a dynamic relationship (Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson 1995). Conse-
quently, the current, dominant understanding of parties is that these are adaptive organizations
that continuously alter their ideological positions (see Adams 2012).
Examples of such party shifts are plentiful. Observers have noted, for example, how
the populist radical right has moved to the ideological center, as exemplified by its embrace
of welfare chauvinism (De Lange 2007, Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2016)—Dutch Prime
Minister Mark Rutte even went so far as to claim that the anti-immigrant PVV was now more
economically left-wing than the Socialist Party.1 By contrast, many mainstream right-wing
parties have moved in the opposite direction, away from the center, on cultural issues (Meguid
2005, Mudde 2013) and European integration (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2016) in response
to the recent surge of these populist challengers. The British Conservative Party, notoriously
divided on the European issue, has also grown considerably more Euroskeptic over time (Bale
2006). While Margaret Thatcher’s criticism of the European project once expedited her ouster
as Prime Minister (PM) and party leader, PM David Cameron actively campaigned on the
promise of a Brexit referendum because he saw no other alternative, stating “What else can I
do? My backbenchers are unbelievably Eurosceptic and UKIP are breathing down my neck.”2
All of these examples signal strategic action in a competitive environment that is ever in flux.
However, despite spatial theory’s assumption of “costless spatial mobility” (Adams
1“Rutte: kans op samenwerking met PVV is nul,” NRC, 15 January, 2017.
2“The downfall of David Cameron: a European tragedy,” The Guardian, 24 June, 2016.
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et al. 2006), there is ample reason to believe that parties cannot always move freely (Dalton
2016, Rovny 2015). Consistent and reliable party labels are said to be an essential element
of representative democracy, as well (Adams 2001, McKelvey & Ordeshook 1986); they
provide a crucial heuristic for vote choice (Downs 1957) and party identification (Campbell
et al. 1960) in a context of uncertainty and limited information. Moreover, cleavage theory
stresses the resilience of mass-elite linkages and the long-term commitments of parties (Lipset
& Rokkan 1967). Finally, the notion of stability also permeates party competition research be-
cause Downs’ contemporary successors share his implicit expectation, or even desire, to iden-
tify an equilibrium in party positions (Adams 2012, Adams, Merrill & Grofman 2005). In-
deed, voter and expert placements of party positions have proven remarkably stable (Adams,
Ezrow & Somer-Topcu 2011, Dalton 2016, Dalton & McAllister 2015). For example, Fig-
ure 1 depicts party change in Germany and the Netherlands, two systems with differing levels
of party system fragmentation.3 Despite Rutte and Cameron’s observation of shifting party
positions, the absence of dramatic fluctuations demonstrates that, in the minds of political sci-
entists, party profiles are relatively durable.














































Party positions in the Netherlands
(b) The Netherlands
Can these two opposing perspectives be coalesced? This paper posits that we can ex-
plain this apparent contradiction between stability and change in European party positions
by embracing the multidimensionality of the policy space in which parties compete (Bakker,
3Party positions taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017).
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Jolly & Polk 2012, Rovny & Polk 2018). Specifically, and in line with Meguid’s seminal work
(2005, 2008), I argue that we need to account for the role of salience, as positional stability
is most likely observed on a party’s primary, most important dimension, while party change
is largely confined to issues secondary to its core agenda. Building on cleavage theory, I as-
sume that parties are born out of, and rooted in, underlying social conflicts and have histori-
cally come to represent specific issues and voters. As a result, they have a reputation to up-
hold and defend on the ideological dimension deemed most salient to them and their sup-
porters (Hooghe & Marks 2018). At the same time, by remaining ideologically true to their
voters’ primary concerns, parties are able to strategically shift on issues of lesser salience.
These shifts allow parties to maximize their vote share without alienating core constituents.
Arguably, the aforementioned examples of parties’ changing ideological stances indeed con-
cern issues and dimensions that are less important to them, from the populist radical right’s
economic agenda to the mainstream’s position on European integration.
I test my hypothesis that positional change is more likely on a party’s secondary di-
mension by using cross-sectional time series analysis on novel trend file data from the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) covering fourteen Western European countries from 1999-2014
(Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017).4 Manifesto data (MARPOR) is used to develop a ra-
tio measure that gauges the relative salience of an ideological dimension to a party (Volkens
et al. 2015). The results confirm my expectations, indicating that party change increases as an
ideological dimension’s party-level salience decreases, and vice versa, particularly for small
to medium-sized and non-governing parties. Alternative operationalizations of the depen-
dent and independent variables, which rely on various configurations of manifesto and expert
survey data, produce similar results (see Appendix 2.3-2.5). Although this paper focuses on
Western Europe for reasons of data availability, my findings should travel to most established
democracies with a history of programmatic politics.
Given the pivotal role of political parties for democratic governance, it is essential to
accurately map the ideological profiles of these political actors. For example, how do ide-
4Countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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ologically constrained parties respond to discontent among their supporters or the rise of
new populist challengers? This paper advances our theoretical understanding of party strat-
egy and democratic representation by moving away from unidimensionality, thus enhancing
our spatial models with realistic insights from both salience and cleavage theory. If party
positions are, in fact, more constrained than commonly assumed, this has important impli-
cations for our understanding of mass-elite linkages, especially in a time when public dis-
affection is believed to be widespread and at an all-time high across Western Europe (e.g.
Hay 2007, Mair 2008, Putnam 2000).
A theory of party change and stability
The study of how political parties compete has a rich and impressive tradition in the
field of comparative politics. Since Downs’ (1957) classic work on the median voter theo-
rem, political scientists have made major advances in understanding how parties locate them-
selves in the political landscape and what factors lead them to alter their ideological positions.
Spatial models—which view party competition through a positional lens, with parties offer-
ing alternative policy proposals to the electorate—have become increasingly sophisticated
and comprehensive (see, e.g., Adams, Merrill & Grofman 2005, Budge 1994, Lin, Enelow &
Dorussen 1999, Schofield 2007). Similarly, recent empirical studies now account for a wide
range of phenomena, including the office and policy-seeking behavior of parties, the multi-
facetedness of voter preferences, and the transformative nature of the policy space (Bélanger
& Meguid 2008, Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002, Kriesi et al. 2006, Meguid 2005).
The causes and consequences of party change remain contested, however. Which fac-
tors explain when and why parties move and, equally importantly, with what magnitude?
Recent studies argue that party positions are highly flexible and volatile, with parties be-
ing responsive to a plethora of endogenous and exogenous changes, such as electoral defeat
(Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010, Somer-Topcu 2009), governing status (Bawn & Somer-
Topcu 2012), economic conditions (Haupt 2010), and the policy moves of their competitors
(Laver 2005, Williams & Whitten 2015). Though seemingly diverse, what these theories share
is an implicit and fundamental belief in the continuity of party change (Adams 2012). And
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this view is not exclusive to academic literature; in popular media, too, we are used to reading
about flip-flopping politicians, increasingly polarized legislatures, and an ever-growing gap
between parties and their (alienated) supporters.
Unsurprisingly then, change is the norm in contemporary models of party competition,
not stability. Especially in longitudinal work, theory and data come together to paint a picture
of party systems operating in a constant—or even increasing (Chiaramonte & Emanuele 2017,
Hernández & Kriesi 2016)—state of flux.
On the formation of party systems and legacies
Yet, for all the attention given to what makes parties move, relatively few studies have
been devoted to what makes them stay put.5 An alternative perspective exists, however, that
stresses the relative durability of party-voter commitments. Cleavage theory is based on the
assumption that party systems reflect the underlying social conflicts in society, shaped (and
upset) only by infrequent critical historical junctures. While not addressing party competition
directly—at least not in the way we typically think of it, as a dynamic system of action and
reaction in a competitive environment—this framework nevertheless raises valuable insights
for the study of party strategic behavior, in particular by highlighting the causal factors that
promote stability and constraint in party positions.
In their pivotal work, Lipset & Rokkan (1967) trace the origins of party system de-
velopment to persistent tensions in society between socio-economic, religious, and politi-
cal groups, produced by the transformative nature of the national and industrial revolutions.
Although not all of these divisions proved equally resilient, or shaped national politics to
the same degree across Western Europe, their theory crucially points our attention to the
underlying—dimensional—structure of party competition.
Indeed, most scholars of European politics now agree that “multidimensionality can-
5Despite the fact that Downs himself acknowledged that parties experience serious constraint on their room
to maneuver, as moving too much and too often would undermine their ideological integrity and responsibility
(1957, 122).
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not be evaded in political practice” (De Sio & Weber 2014, 870).6 A second, or even third,
dimension needs to be added to the ubiquitous economic left-right divide.7 While going by
many different labels, the meaning of this second dimension typically encompasses cultural
issues, including (though not limited to) immigration, law and order, and environmental poli-
tics (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002, Inglehart 1990, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi et al. 2012).8
As such, cleavage theory draws two major conclusions, namely that (1) the politi-
cal space in Western European democracies is arguably best described by more than one di-
mension, and (2) parties emerge from specific cleavages in society and are, thus, the primary
representatives of distinct voter groups. Parties develop meaningful and lasting issue reputa-
tions over time, and these historical legacies can produce strong linkages with their support-
ers. In the words of Lipset and Rokkan, “parties do not simply present themselves de novo
to the citizen at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of al-
ternatives they present the electorate” (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 2). What is more, such repu-
tations can be revived or strengthened over time, e.g. through a party’s performance in gov-
ernment, and these long-standing images can crucially shape party competition (Bélanger &
Meguid 2008).9 In fact, salience theory argues that competence can become the fundamental
criterion by which parties compete for the electorate’s vote (Stokes 1963; see also Budge &
Farlie 1983, Egan 2013, Petrocik 1963).
Nevertheless, whether it is by virtue of deeply-rooted societal divisions or less distant
track records in office, both cleavage and salience theory shed light on the importance of his-
6For a counter-argument, see Van der Brug & Van Spanje (2009).
7Different cleavages have been said to constitute a third dimension of political contestation, e.g. on the in-
clusiveness of polity (or ‘group’) membership (Kitschelt & Rehm 2014), or European integration (Bakker, Jolly
& Polk 2012), but these three-dimensional accounts of party alignments are less common.
8It is important to note, however, that the cleavage structure of party competition is ultimately national in
nature, and additional dimensions may come to shape politics in a given country—in fact, the dominant dimen-
sion might be of a third kind, such as the center-periphery cleavage. In countries such as Belgium and the United
Kingdom, for instance, territorial issues have increasingly come to shape domestic politics. But my focus is on
the two dimensions that can be found in every Western European country, namely the economic and the cultural
axes of contestation.
9Arguably, it is the very nature of political conflict itself that perpetuates and reinforces an ideological di-
mension’s collective identities (Bornschier 2010).
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torical reputations for political contestation. By shaping a party’s public profile, party legacies
can inform expectations among (potential) supporters and influence their voting behavior. In
contrast to the strategic interactions in a Downsian framework, these party-voter linkages are
expected to be durable and to foster stability over multiple election cycles.
Party strategy in a multidimensional environment
How can we integrate these opposing perspectives of party change and stability? I
propose an ontology of party competition that unites the two schools in a unified framework
and accounts for the limitations on parties’ strategic actions. Rather than seeing the two ap-
proaches as mutually exclusive, the Downsian and Rokkanian models of party behavior can
complement each other (Rovny 2015). In a multidimensional competitive environment, par-
ties encounter ideological dimensions with varying levels of salience. This relative salience
differential produces a primary and a secondary dimension, and will inevitably inform a
party’s strategic behavior. In the words of Schattschneider, a party is “a coalition of inferior
interests held together by a dominant interest” (1960).
Building on cleavage theory, parties are expected to be rooted on their primary dimen-
sion. Not only does a party place more salience on its related issues, it has a core constituency
of voters with whom they are connected through a given cleavage and the durability of this
linkage is self-enforcing (Hooghe & Marks 2018).10 Party activists and future leaders are
recruited from this very cadre of supporters, they share a common sense of belonging, and
they are part and parcel of the intra-party decision-making process. To the extent that they are
policy-seeking, which might depend on the internal balance of power between leaders and ac-
tivists (Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013), party change could be perceived as “selling out”
the party’s policy objectives for short-term electoral gains (Adams et al. 2006). The degree
of ‘rootedness’ may vary, but every party will experience relative immobility on its primary
dimension, which at best allows it to seek out local maxima to secure votes. Parties have a
10This should be true even in an era of cleavage decline (Knutsen 2005, Thomassen 2005), party detachment
(Mair 2008, Mair & Van Biezen 2001), and increased issue voting (Green-Pedersen 2007). As Hooghe & Marks
(2018) note, cleavage voting is not all or nothing. Rather, dealignment is coupled with realignment, as can be
seen when explaining support for Green and radical right parties.
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reputation to uphold and defend, and this makes positional change far more risky, undesirable,
and, thus, less likely.
But how do parties act on their secondary dimension? Interestingly, most studies of
party competition today still rely on a unidimensional framework (e.g. Ezrow et al. 2011,
Tomz & Houweling 2008), not only to aid in the parsimoniousness of their models but, like
Downs, in order to abstract an equilibrium in party positions (Adams, Merrill & Grofman
2005, De Sio & Weber 2014). Yet, as mentioned before, a simple, unidimensional model of
party competition does not capture and explain the positional differences between parties.
Moreover, recent research has shown that the use of a two-dimensional strategy is common-
place in Western Europe, as most parties actively engage with their secondary dimension
(Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Rovny 2015).
Hence, in recent years a growing number of studies has come out that analyzes party
change in a context of multidimensionality (e.g. Rovny 2012, Rovny & Edwards 2012).11
While parties are undeniably more rooted and vested in their primary cleavage, they cannot
fully ignore the other dimensions of the policy space. That said, they are not without agency,
either (Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015). Specifically, one would expect fewer positional con-
straints on a party’s secondary dimension, as it is not burdened by long-lasting party-voter
linkages. As Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber put it (2015: 841), “a party’s reputation and its goal
to gain and defend issue ownership limit its strategic flexibility on its primary dimension.
In contrast, parties have more strategic flexibility on their secondary dimension” (see also
Alonso 2012).
Consequently, this leaves room for parties to attempt to increase their vote share. A
range of strategies has been identified in the literature, such as moderating one’s position,
zigzagging ideologically, changing course only when faced with electoral losses, or approach-
11Although a connection can be made here with the literature on position blurring (Rovny 2012, Rovny
2013), this study’s contribution is distinctly different. The two accounts are similar in that both emphasize the
interaction between position and salience in multidimensional party competition, but blurring is a strategy used
primarily by extremist parties. My theory, on the other hand, applies to mainstream and challenger parties alike.
Additionally, it is important to note that the strategic positional shifts described in this paper are not meant to
produce ambiguity about a party’s position. On the contrary, they are often explicit and intended to strengthen a
party’s electoral appeal, such as in the aforementioned case of populist radical right parties moving to the center
on the left-right dimension.
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ing and capitalizing on the largest party’s gains (Laver 2005).12 All of these alternatives ul-
timately serve to maximize electoral support and alleviate internal and external pressures on
the party leadership.13 A party could, for instance, approach the median voter on its secondary
dimension in an attempt to broaden its appeal to include more centrist voters. Moreover, if
parties are not unitary actors but rather are internally factionalized, party change can be used
to assuage intra-party dissent (Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010).
Taken together, the above theoretical framework asserts that the constellation of par-
ties is neither invariably volatile nor persistently static. The party systems of Western Europe
are certainly not frozen, and change is possible, both through the entry of new parties and the
(strategic) positional shifts of existing ones. However, neither should we expect the complete
fluidity and inevitability of disequilibria that is so often assumed to stem from multidimen-
sionality (Arrows 1951, De Sio & Weber 2014, Laver & Sergenti 2012). This leads me to for-
mulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The greater the relative salience of a party’s position on its focal
dimension, the less flexible its position on that dimension.
Although the hypothesized relationship between salience and party change is relevant
for understanding the behavior of all parties, its predicted effect is expected to be strongest
for a particular subset of parties. First, larger parties are likely to have broader issue agen-
das (Wagner & Meyer 2014), potentially making the difference between their primary and
secondary dimension smaller. Second, parties in government have no reason to upend the sta-
tus quo by introducing new patterns of conflict (Van Heck 2018), nor can they avoid taking
clear policy stances (Rovny 2013). Relatedly, government participation is arguably the most
effective way for a party to establish issue ownership, including on issues outside of its core
agenda, which makes its program less narrow and diminishes the difference between a party’s
12Typically, only one of the identified strategies has stability at its core. So-called “stickers” are not interested
in the dynamic interactions with voters or rival parties, and they will stay true to their original position.
13It is possible that a party will attempt to assimilate or subsume outside issues into its primary, pre-existing
ideological cleavage (Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Marks & Wilson 2000). This is a viable strategy, but it is
unlikely to account for all salience attributed to a party’s secondary dimension, especially when it encompasses a
wide range of socio-cultural issues.
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primary and secondary dimension (Greene 2016). Finally, as extremist parties might empha-
size their non-centrist positions (Wagner 2012), this could produce more pronounced and
specialized issue appeals, resulting in more constraint on their primary dimension yet more
flexibility on their secondary dimension. This does assume that extremist parties have broad
enough platforms to address both dimensions, including issues outside of their core agenda,
which might not always hold true (see, e.g. Bischof 2017).
Data & method
The above hypothesis is tested using pooled time-series analysis on novel trend file
data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) spanning five waves from 1999-2014 (Bakker
et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017). The ideological positions of close to one hundred parties from
fourteen Western European countries are included here: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.14 The dataset contains expert evaluations of political parties and their
ideological positions on a range of issues and dimensions, including the economic left-right
dimension and the cultural GAL-TAN, or Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/ Authori-
tarian/Nationalist dimension (both ranging 0-10).
The validity and reliability of party position data has been debated extensively over
the years. I opt to use expert data, because this data source has been rigorously tested, cross-
validated, and shown to perform as well as, if not better than, other measures, such as mass
survey and manifesto data (Marks et al. 2007, Steenbergen & Marks 2007). Existing survey
data unfortunately do not allow me to effectively study how voters evaluate the multidimen-
sional positions of political parties over time, but expert and voter placements of party posi-
tions have been shown to be strongly correlated (Dalton & McAllister 2015), which not only
adds to the reliability of my study but also its relevance, as the positional shifts discussed here
are also picked up by voters. While it has been argued that experts are more prone to detect
continuity in party positions than other observers (McDonald, Mendes & Kim 2007), as they
14The data span five separate waves (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014), though not all parties are consis-
tently included across the five waves.
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‘merely’ update their perceptions of party reputations, using expert survey data is neither an
overly optimistic nor a decisively conservative test because I am ultimately analyzing both
stability and change in party positions. Finally, although the main alternative data source,
manifesto data, is widely considered to be a valid and direct measure of the importance of is-
sues for political parties, it has received criticism for conflating salience with position (Geme-
nis 2013; see also Mölder 2016). Consequently, I use manifesto data to measure salience (see
below). Multiple robustness checks using alternative measures for the dependent and indepen-
dent variables, including party positions based on manifesto data, confirm the main finding of
this paper (see Appendix 2.3-2.5).
Having introduced my main dataset, I will now discuss the measurement of my key
variables. A complete overview of their operationalization can be found in Table 1.
Dependent variables
In order to test my hypothesis, I need a measure of party position change so as to map
ideological flexibility on different dimensions. Because I am not interested in the direction
of change, I use the absolute difference in the average expert evaluation of a party’s position
from one wave to the next—both on the economic left-right and the non-economic GAL-TAN
dimension.15 In other words, the higher a party’s score on the dependent variable, the greater
its positional change on this dimension as compared to the previous time point—regardless of
the direction of change. I run separate models for each dependent variable.
Figure 2 presents the histograms for both dependent variables. Overall, party change
is more substantial on GAL-TAN than left-right, as the former’s distribution is less skewed
towards zero. However, the statistics for both measures are similar despite the distinctiveness
of the two dimensions, with the economic left-right dimension being ubiquitous and coherent
across Europe, whereas GAL-TAN is generally considered to be more of a theoretical con-
struct that encompasses a wide range of issues. This is a welcome finding, as it suggests that
party behavior on left-right and GAL-TAN is more comparable than anticipated.
15A differenced dependent variable has the added advantage of taking care of potential heteroskedasticity and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































So how can one best distinguish between a party’s primary and secondary dimensions?
For this paper, the focus is on salience, or the relative importance of a given issue or dimen-
sion to a party, as its relationship with cleavages is well established in the literature (see, for
example, Hooghe & Marks 2018). The most straightforward strategy would be to rank the two
dimensions by salience for each individual party. For some parties this might be a straight-
forward exercise, but for others parties it can be more challenging to make this assessment.
For instance, GAL-TAN is certainly the primary dimension for Green and populist radical
right parties, but what about for the Christian democrats? Certainly, part of their conservative
image comes from their positions on social issues, but their economic profile is often clearly
pronounced, as well. As a result, I propose to identify the primary and secondary dimension
of a party using quantitative means. Not only is this method more transparent, but also it al-
lows for more variation. Instead of creating a strict dichotomy between a party’s primary and
secondary dimension, one can measure the relative ‘primariness’ of each dimension and its
relationship with party change.
The most commonly used measure of party-level salience comes from MARPOR,
or the comparative manifesto project (Volkens et al. 2015). This data set classifies quasi-
sentences of party manifestos using a coding scheme of 56 categories to gauge the relative
16
importance of an issue area to a party (as a percentage of the entire manifesto). By aggregat-
ing (most of) these categories into clusters, the salience of entire ideological dimensions can
be mapped.
The exercise of abstracting ideological dimensions from party-level data is a con-
tentious one. Ultimately, the policy space in which parties compete is not directly observable,
meaning that no ‘true’ map exists. Yet, following the recommendations of Benoit & Laver
(2012), we can use our a priori assumptions to guide us in the estimation process. Thus, I ab-
stract two dimensions from the 56 MARPOR categories. The employed categorization can
be found in Table 6 (Appendix 2.1), which builds on existing work (e.g. Spies & Franzmann
2011, Stoll 2010). However, because I am not limited to directional items only, my coding
scheme is more inclusive, with 20 issue categories per dimension. Each category carries equal
weight in my calculations, as weighting methods are inherently focused on the party system
and not the individual party (cf. Bakker & Hobolt 2013). I use the ratio between the two di-
mensions to gauge relative salience at the time of the most recent national election, with the
variable ranging from 1 (manifesto solely about left-right) to -1 (all about GAL-TAN). For
example, if Party A devotes 70% of its manifesto to left-right issues and only 30% to GAL-
TAN, it would receive a score of 0.40, which, because it is positive, indicates that economic
issues are relatively more salient to the party than cultural issues.16
Finally, since a party does not have full control over its own issue agenda, as other par-
ties also shape the public debate (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010), I account for ‘systemic
salience’ by subtracting the party system average from the above score, excluding the party’s
own salience score.17 A positive score means that a party puts relatively more emphasis on





17While some have used similar calculations (see, for instance, Bischof 2017), others have instead opted to
account for systemic salience by including a separate control variable (e.g. Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010,
Van Heck 2018). In those cases, however, the dependent variable was party-level salience and not positional
change. Furthermore, I do not expect to explain party change using the variation in dimensional salience that is
explained by systemic factors, as my focus is on a party’s own legacy and reputation.
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Control variables
I include multiple control variables in my model. I expect larger parties, measured by
vote share in the last national election, to be less mobile, because significant electoral success
leads to a more complex and professional organization whose ideological course is harder
to change. Similarly, ‘older’ parties should have more established reputations and, thus, less
flexible positions. Next, I account for participation in government. Wielding executive power
binds a party by its actions in government, because voters hold them accountable. Moreover,
from a Rikerian perspective, a party has less of an incentive to alter the status quo when it en-
joys frequent access to government. Instead, political losers who are excluded from office do
seek to promote new conflict in an attempt to turn their electoral fortunes around. Both factors
should limit party change on the primary and secondary dimensions for government parties.
An indicator variable records whether a party was in government during the previous wave.
Because parties operating at the fringes of the political landscape have more room to maneu-
ver, I control for the effect of ideological extremism, assessed by a party’s distance from the
center.18 In addition, there is an extensive literature on the relationship between party organi-
zation and positional change. That is, leadership-dominated parties are assumed to be more
strategic, office-seeking, and ideologically flexible than organizations in which the balance
of power is tipped in favor of policy-seeking activists (Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013).
I include a control variable for party organization (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012), with
higher scores indicating leadership dominance in setting party policy. Finally, as discussed,
several of the above control variables have the potential to moderate the effect of salience on
party change. For that reason, I include interaction effects that model the relationship between
salience and party size, government status, and ideological extremism, respectively.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for my dependent and independent variables.
As noted above, my two dependent variables produce very similar statistics. These results
could be interpreted to mean that party positions are more stable on ideological dimensions
compared to individual issues due to the level of aggregation. That is, party change could ap-
18I use the absolute midpoint of the scale (here, 5 on a scale from 0-10) as the ideological center.
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pear less likely when adopting a dimensional approach because of the clustering of a multi-
tude of issues, with positional changes canceling each other out. It turns out, however, that
party change across aggregated dimensions and individual issues is highly comparable.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Chapter 2)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Change Left-Right 0.50 0.46 0.00 3.06
Change GAL-TAN 0.58 0.51 0.00 2.90
Salience 0.02 0.27 -0.89 1.04
Vote share 14.46 12.16 0.15 45.40
Government participation 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Distance center, Left-Right 1.94 1.15 0.00 4.91
Distance center, GAL-TAN 2.08 1.19 0.00 4.83
Age 51.22 39.68 4.00 176.00
Party organization 0.44 0.23 -0.25 1.00
The main independent variable, which gauges the party-level salience ratio of left-
right to GAL-TAN issues, varies considerably, despite being anchored by the party system
average. The highest score (1.04) belongs to Nea Dimokratia in 2014, as it devoted most of its
manifesto to economic issues while the average across the other included Greek parties was
slightly negative (-0.15). The lowest three scores, on the other hand, are all held by the Dansk
Folkeparti (≤ −0.79), as it places great emphasis on GAL-TAN issues, especially compared
to the other parties. Figure 3 shows the average salience scores by party family. As expected,
radical right and green parties focus primarily on cultural issues, while the economy takes
precedence for most mainstream parties as well as the radical left.
Average national vote share ranges from a mere 0.15% to more than 45%, but the av-
erage across all observations is close to 14.5%. 40% of my party-year observations concerned
parties in government at the time of the previous wave. Ideological extremism, measured as
the distance from the ideological mid-point, encompasses almost the entire possible range (0-
5), but the average is around 2 units away from the center on both dimensions. The included
parties vary substantially in age, from newly founded organizations to the British Conserva-
19
tive Party’s 176 in 2014.19 Finally, few included parties are strongly activist-dominated, as
indicated by both the mean (0.44) and the range (-0.25, 1.00). This means that, typically, the
party leadership is dominant in determining the organization’s course. A correlation matrix
for all included variables can be found in Table 7 (Appendix 2.2).
Fig. 3: Salience of Left-Right to GAL-TAN by party family











I run a cross-sectional time series analysis with party-year as the unit of observation.
My dependent variables are first-differenced, tracking party change on each dimension from
one wave to the next. This allows me to analyze the direct effect of a dimension’s salience
level on Y . The generalized model can be specified as follows:
|∆positioni,t| = α + β1saliencei,t + β2controlsi,t + εi,t (1)
It is important to note that while my dependent variables are differenced, my main in-
dependent variable is not. That is, I use the level of a dimension’s salience during the most re-
cent national election prior to t to explain party change (t− t−1), not the difference in salience
between t and t−1. The reason for this is that I expect a party to consistently move around
19One might expect that party size, age, and ideological extremism are strongly correlated, but this is not the
case. It is not true that, on the whole, new parties are smaller and more extremist (see Table 7, Appendix 2.2).
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more on a dimension that is less salient, even when the level of salience of that dimension
does not change. Put differently, complete stability on the independent variable can lead to
great fluctuations on the dependent variable, especially when there is a clear salience differen-
tial between left-right and GAL-TAN.
Tests show that the residuals at time t−1 are a good predictor of the residuals at t, indi-
cating a problem with serial correlation, specifically of the panel-specific AR(1) type. Instead
of using the traditional correction that leads one to include a lagged dependent variable on the
right-hand side, I use the Prais-Winsten solution, as recent work has shown that the former
approach can lead to bias and wash out the effect of the variables that are of theoretical inter-
est (Plümper, Troeger & Manow 2005).20 Finally, tests also indicate that my data suffer from
panel-level heteroskedasticity. This is perhaps not surprising, given the multitude of parties,
nested within countries, that compose my dataset. I therefore use corrected standard errors in
my analysis.
Analysis
Table 3 presents the results of my analyses for both dependent variables. Models 1 and
3 provide a baseline for my main specifications of interest, models 2 and 4. These full models
include the interaction terms with vote share, government participation, and ideological ex-
tremity to study the conditional effect of salience on party change. Starting with the left-right
dimension, we see that as the relative salience ratio of economic to cultural issues increases
in comparison to the party system average, positional change decreases. The effect is reversed
on the GAL-TAN dimension. That is, party change becomes less likely when a dimension’s
salience increases. The coefficient estimate for salience is consistently smaller in the baseline
models, and only statistically significant for party change on the left-right dimension. This
is not surprising, however, as these models do not account for the conditioning effect of the
20Like most research on party competition, my data set is of the N > T variety, meaning that I have fewer
time points than panels, which could lead to overly optimistic estimates (Hoechle 2007). For that reason, I also
ran my analyses without modeling for time, both by omitting the correction for autocorrelation and by using a
random effects model instead of Prais-Winsten regression. While the standard errors vary, my key coefficient
estimates consistently have the same sign and are largely of a similar magnitude, thus supporting the substantive
conclusions reported below.
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interaction terms. A party’s vote share and participation in government, in particular, are ex-
pected to abate the effect of salience on party change.
Table 3: Regression analysis of absolute party changes, 1999-2014
Left-Right GAL-TAN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salience -.061* -.221* .015 .186*
(.020) (.056) (.015) (.049)
Vote share .004* .002* -.002* -.002*
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.001)
Government participation -.107* -.077* -.026* -.029
(.020) (.019) (.012) (.015)
Distance center -.063* -.067* .064* .066*
(.006) (.008) (.006) (.005)
Age -.002* -.002* .001* .001*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Party organization .298* .368* .423* .420*
(.028) (.034) (.014) (.015)
Salience × vote share .008* -.004
(.003) (.003)
Salience × govt. participation .041 -.067
(.048) (.048)
Salience × distance center .019 -.037*
(.024) (.014)
Constant .569* .554* .232 .228*
(.020) (.025) (.017) (.015)
N 282 282 282 282
Wald 2236.24 2101.12 2098.37 137669.23
Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients corrected for panel-level
heteroskedasticity and standard errors (in parentheses).
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Moving on to models 2 and 4, both coefficient estimates on salience are statistically
significant and in line with my hypothesis. The coefficient on the left-right dimension is sub-
stantively larger. This makes sense, given that the GAL-TAN dimension is less coherent.
Ideological change on the left-right dimension should always concern a party’s position on
matters of redistribution and government intervention in the economy, whereas GAL-TAN
encompasses diverse cultural issues, such as law and order, immigration, and environmental
protection. That being said, coefficient estimates of around 0.20 are substantial, as the average
positional change of a party is around 0.50 on each dimension (see Table 2).
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Of the included control variables, vote share and age have statistically significant co-
efficients, but with effect sizes that are marginal and not of substantive interest. Interestingly,
while ideologically extremist parties are more likely to change position on GAL-TAN, they
are actually less likely to do so on the left-right dimension. This is an intriguing finding that
warrants further exploration. Finally, the effect of party organization on positional change is
very convincing, with leadership-dominated parties being far more likely to alter their ide-
ological positions than their more activist counterparts. This is true on both dimensions and
corroborates the findings of recent studies (e.g. Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013).
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However, while the signs and statistical significance of the reported findings are imme-
diately interpretable, the best way to study their effects is by means of marginal effects plots.
Figure 4 shows that the marginal effect of salience on left-right party change decreases as a
party’s vote share increases, before becoming statistically indistinguishable from zero when
the 95% confidence intervals include the null. The other interacting variables, government
participation and distance from center, are set at 0 (i.e. not in government) and 2 (the median
value), respectively. This is in line with my expectation, because larger parties have broader
issue agendas that will diminish the salience differential between their primary and secondary
dimension. The reverse is true for the marginal effect of salience on the GAL-TAN dimen-
sion; the coefficient estimate is positive at first, before becoming statistically indistinguishable
from zero. On both dimensions the cut-off lies between a national vote share of 10-15%. Al-
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though this may seem low, well over half of my party-year observations fall below this thresh-
old, meaning that the marginal effect of salience is not statistically significant for relatively
large parties.
Next, Figure 5 graphs the marginal effect of salience on party change by government
participation for each dimension. As before, the other interacting variables, vote and distance
from center, are set at their respective median values, 8.1 and 2. Once a party enters govern-
ment, it inevitably needs to expand, and concede partial control over, its own issue agenda.
This reduces the salience differential between a party’s primary and secondary dimension and
decreases its marginal effect on party change—or, in the case of the GAL-TAN dimension,
makes it statistically indistinguishable from zero.
















































Finally, Figure 6 plots the marginal effect of salience on party change by degree of
ideological extremism. The other interacting variables, vote and government participation,
are set at 8.1 (the median value) and 0 (i.e. not in government), respectively. As discussed,
one might expect that extremist parties would have more pronounced and narrow programs,
thereby increasing the effect of salience. Yet, on both dimensions, the marginal effect ap-
proaches zero as a party becomes more extremist, indicating no meaningful difference be-
tween its primary and secondary dimension. Although this could be due in part to the limited
number of observations at the edges of the political spectrum, more theoretical explanations
can be formulated. It is possible that extremist parties truly operate on a single dimension,
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with a narrow platform, thus reducing the effect of a dimensional salience differential. Alter-
natively, perhaps there is a ‘ceiling effect’ that prevents extremist parties from moving fur-
ther away from the center (Somer-Topcu 2015), which would also lead to a decrease in the
marginal effect of salience on party change. Nevertheless, this is an interesting finding that
warrants further investigation.
Fig. 6: Marginal effects of salience on party change
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Taken together, my empirical analyses consistently confirm the overarching hypothesis
of this paper. I also ran multiple robustness checks to alleviate potential concerns about the
validity of this finding (see Appendix 2.3-2.5). The conclusion that a party’s position is less
flexible when a dimension’s relative salience is high holds when (1) using alternative opera-
tionalizations of key variables, including those which rely on manifesto data to gauge party
change or employ an expert-level measure of salience; (2) looking at long-term party change
across more than one wave—that is, t compared to t−2 as the dependent variable—to rule out
the alternative explanation that my findings are solely driven by short-term zigzagging or ex-
pert uncertainty; (3) analyzing positional shifts across different levels of aggregation, from the
two ideological dimensions analyzed here to specific issues related to left-right, GAL-TAN,
and European integration; (4) directly comparing party change on the two dimensions by us-
ing a single ratio as the dependent variable, similar to my salience measure; and (5) including
country and/or year fixed effects. Finally, a possible concern could be that expert evaluations
are ‘noisier’ on a party’s less salient dimension due to a lack of information, which might, in
25
turn, explain my findings. The correlation between party change and the standard deviation in
expert evaluations is weak, however.21 Together, these robustness checks increase my confi-
dence in the main finding reported in this study.
Discussion
The study of party competition is crucial for our understanding of representative
democracy. While much of the party competition literature has focused on the causes and
magnitude of party change, voter and expert placements of parties have drawn attention to the
perceived stability in parties’ ideological positions. Building on insights from cleavage theory,
this paper has attempted to provide a reasonable solution to reconcile these opposing per-
spectives. By accounting for the multidimensionality of the policy space in Western Europe
and the pivotal role of historical party legacies, we can distinguish between a party’s primary
and secondary dimension, and we can start to assess their importance for the study of party
change. Parties cannot always reposition themselves without effort, cost, or punishment, as
formal theorists typically assume (Adams et al. 2006). Rather, they are expected to be rooted
on their primary dimension, as their reputation and relatively strong party-voter linkages put
considerable limitations on ideological flexibility, whereas fewer constraints exist on their sec-
ondary dimension, allowing for more strategic, vote-maximizing behavior. Certainly, parties
can and do change positions on their core dimension (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2011),
but I have argued that such (potentially high profile) policy shifts are relatively less common
and auspicious.
The results of my analyses are robust across a variety of alternative operationalizations
and confirm the hypothesis that party change becomes less likely as the party-level salience
of an ideological dimension increases. Indeed, on the left-right dimension for instance, the
three largest positional shifts in my data set were all made by populist radical right parties
(party change > 2), namely the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid, the French Front National, and
the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs—parties for whom the GAL-TAN dimension
21The correlations for left-right and GAL-TAN are 0.29 and -0.02, respectively.
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was considerably more salient than left-right compared to the rest of the party system. On the
other hand, the three smallest positional changes between waves on the economic dimension
(change < 0.02) all concerned mainstream parties: The Spanish Partido Popular, the Swedish
Socialdemokraterna, and the Dutch Partij van de Arbeid.
Theoretically, this paper follows a line of recent research that has started to test and
expand on some of the most fundamental assumptions on which our models of party compe-
tition rest (Hobolt & De Vries 2015, Rovny 2013, Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013). Al-
though these assumptions have served us well, this paper moves the literature in a new direc-
tion. It is by no means unique in its endeavor to join spatial and salience theory (e.g. Meguid
2005), but it is one of the first attempts to formulate a concrete set of predictions grounded
in both Downsian and Rokkanian insights (Rovny 2015). Its focus on multidimensional-
ity and the subsequent salience differential provides a new lens for studying party strategy
across ideological dimensions that have varying levels of importance. This paper has made
a methodological contribution to the field by utilizing the strengths of two widely used mea-
sures of party behavior, namely expert survey and manifesto data. MARPOR data (Volkens
et al. 2015) provided a valid measure of dimensional salience and its importance for explain-
ing the positional shifts of parties, tracked using CHES data (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al.
2017).
The empirical finding that salience predicts both stability and change in party positions
has important implications for the study of democratic representation and party strategy. Far
from being mutually exclusive, a party can opt to employ different strategies on different ide-
ological dimension. This article supports the idea that a party will favor stability over change
on its core dimension in order to prevent alienating its most loyal supporters, while on sec-
ondary issues it will be more likely to branch out and frequently alter its program in order to
reach out to new voter groups and attempt to maximize its electoral support. The strong con-
ditioning effect of government participation on this relationship between salience and party
change suggests that holding executive power is truly a transformative experience for parties,
which corroborates research that distinguishes between mainstream and challenger parties
based on government experience (Hobolt & De Vries 2015).
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While this paper sheds new light on party change, further research is needed. What
about the direction of change? Does public opinion matter for the salience of ideological di-
mensions? And do voters pick up on parties’ positional shifts, whether large or small? We do
not have all the answers yet—and better data on, for instance, multidimensional voter place-
ments of parties could contribute to that effort—but this article lays the framework for future
research to investigate these questions more fully.
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CHAPTER 3: POSITION BLURRING IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTEXT
Citizens choose. They vote. [. . . ] Politicians also choose. [. . . ] They choose
sometimes to highlight their acts by seeking publicity for them. At other times,
they obscure them by acting quietly, perhaps by taking positions that are contra-
dictory or confusing.
— Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson (2002, 9)
In 1997, the British Conservative Party devoted roughly one in every fifteen quasi-
sentences in its manifesto to the European Union and its relationship with the United King-
dom (UK). Its position on European integration was by no means unambiguous, however. On
the one hand, the party called for a “flexible Europe” and supported “the aspirations of the
Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and others to join the European Union.” At the same time, it ar-
gued that “a nation’s common heritage, culture, values and outlook are a precious source of
stability,” and it would therefore “retain Britain’s veto and oppose further extension of qual-
ified majority voting in order to [. . . ] prevent policies that would be harmful to the national
interest.” This mixed message was perhaps best summarized by the adage: “We want to be
in Europe but not run by Europe.” More recently, observers have called out the contradictory
positions of the Labour Party on Europe in the wake of the Brexit referendum, as its leader,
Jeremy Corbyn, stated that he “favoured remaining in a customs union to preserve the free
movement of goods and a soft border within Ireland, but rejected staying in the single market
because of its neoliberal aspects.”22
Why would a political party adopt an equivocal position? Although scholars typically
assume that position blurring is costly (Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991, Shepsle 1972), a grow-
ing literature suggests that, at times, party leaders have an incentive to deliberately eschew
from clear position taking, especially on issues they are less invested in (Elias, Szöcsik &
22“Jeremy Corbyn should offer pro-EU hope, not more fears about Brexit”, The Guardian, 8 March, 2018.
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Zuber 2015, Rovny 2012, Rovny 2013). For instance, a party could opt to shun an issue on
which its voters are divided or, alternatively, it might try to broaden its support by reaching
out to opposing ideological camps through otherwise inconsistent policy statements. Recent
work has therefore started to examine the relative uncertainty about parties’ ideological po-
sitions, because it could be a product of their attempts to manipulate the structure of political
competition (Rovny & Edwards 2012).
It is unclear, however, how a party blurs its positions. This study breaks new ground
by analyzing the ways in which a party seeks to create uncertainty about where it stands on
an issue, and their relative effectiveness. I show that three distinct blurring strategies can be
identified—avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation—but that their desirability and feasibility
vary by party. Cross-sectional time series analyses across fourteen Western European democ-
racies from 1999-2017 confirm that issue evasion, conflicting positions, and altered policy
appeals all increase uncertainty about party positions on European integration.23 Yet, avoid-
ance is a less effective strategy when a party has a more established reputation, for example
because it is electorally successful or part of a government coalition, while ambiguity is of
limited use to a party that is ideologically moderate or leadership-dominated. Finally, alterna-
tion is more appropriate when an issue is less salient to a party. I use expert disagreement as a
proxy for voter uncertainty, which, if we assume that experts are the most informed observers,
provides a conservative test of my predictions.
Globalization, European integration, socio-economic developments, immigration, and
a new information environment are dramatically transforming European society and poli-
tics. Voting behavior is now less predictable (Knutsen 2005, Thomassen 2005), party-voter
linkages are weakening (Mair 2008, Mair & Van Biezen 2001), and individual issues are in-
creasingly shaping politics (Green-Pedersen 2007). While some scholars have focused on
the opportunities that a changing political landscape, and its new lines of conflict, can offer
to especially the losers of the existing status quo (Carmines & Stimson 1986, Hobolt & De
Vries 2015, Riker 1986, Van de Wardt, De Vries & Hobolt 2014), there is an increased aware-
23The included countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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ness for the uncertainty and risks involved with multidimensional party competition. This
study contributes to the position blurring literature by showing how, and under what condi-
tions, ‘blurring’ strategies can produce ‘blurred’ outcomes.
The policy promises of political parties and candidates are an essential component of
democratic representation and responsiveness, because policymakers are expected to do what
citizens want them to do (Dahl 1989, Huber & Powell 1992). Political parties are the interme-
diary that responds to public opinion (Adams et al. 2004, Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson 1995)
and, in return, citizens vote for the party that is ideologically most proximate to them (Downs
1957, Enelow & Hinich 1984, Tomz & Houweling 2008). Although position blurring is not
new, nor is theorizing about politicians’ motivations to do so (Alesina & Cukierman 1990,
Aragonès & Neeman 2000, Callander & Wilson 2008, Meirowitz 2005), it has become a more
useful and attractive strategy for party leaders in a time when party competition is increas-
ingly volatile, unpredictable, and multidimensional. In this context, it is important to under-
stand how a party may use position blurring to insulate itself from political accountability and
electoral punishment.
Why do parties blur?
Before I introduce the main position blurring strategies that are available to a party, we
need a better understanding of the incentives that party leaders may have to deliberately create
uncertainty about their policy preferences. Indeed, much of our understanding of contempo-
rary political contestation rests on the assumption that party positions are important to demo-
cratic representation, as they provide a valuable tool for voters to evaluate the political choices
available to them. Parties compete with each other during election campaigns by promoting
contrasting programmatic platforms, their subsequent actions in government are influenced
by their promised policies, and citizens rely on ideological proximity to determine their vote
choice (Adams et al. 2004, Dahl 1989, Huber & Powell 1992, Laver & Sergenti 2012). In the
academic literature on party competition, spatial theory provides a welcome simplification to
the plethora of issues that might inform party and voter behavior by aggregating individual
policies into broad, overarching ideological dimensions (Adams 2012, Downs 1957). From
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this perspective, obfuscation is logically expected to be costly, if not downright detrimental, to
a party’s electoral fortunes (Bartels 1986, Franklin 1991, Shepsle 1972).
Yet, the political environment in Western Europe has changed dramatically since the
1970s, as politics has become more volatile (Knutsen 2005, Mair 1997, Thomassen 2005)
and new cross-cutting cleavages now structure the relationships between citizens and elites
(Hooghe & Marks 2018, Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002, Inglehart 1990, Kitschelt 1994,
Kriesi et al. 2012). Although multidimensionality is still frequently avoided in party competi-
tion research (e.g. Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009, Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010, Ezrow
et al. 2011), it is clear that the policy space in which parties compete is no longer fixed.
Rather, it is in flux and diversifying the political agendas of voters and parties alike. This
presents party leaders with a challenging question: how to position the party on policy issues
that fall outside of its core agenda?
As scholars have begun to analyze how parties try to manipulate the increasingly fluid
structure of political contestation in their favor (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen 2010, Rovny &
Edwards 2012), two different perspectives are worth highlighting here. First, one can identify
a more aggressive, risk-seeking approach that aims to promote conflict on an emerging issue
to divide a party’s competitors while strengthening its own position. Extending the seminal
work by Riker (1986), an exciting body of research explores how new issues and dimensions
can be exploited by a party to upend the status quo (see also Carmines & Stimson 1986). The
introduction of a new axis of political conflict can be beneficial especially to the current losers
of party competition, such as niche parties (Meguid 2005, Meguid 2008), opposition parties
(Van de Wardt, De Vries & Hobolt 2014), or issue entrepreneurs (De Vries & Hobolt 2012,
Hobolt & De Vries 2015).
Alternatively, attempts to manipulate the dimensional structure of political contesta-
tion can be driven by risk-averse behavior. In the same way that the potential consequences of
positional shifts can be unpredictable and costly (Adams et al. 2006, Janda et al. 1995, Somer-
Topcu 2009), expanding a party’s agenda beyond its primary set of issues could reveal internal
party divisions, compromise future coalition negotiations, and alienate voters. In other words,
a party might be best served by refraining from engaging with secondary issues. It can opt
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to address only those issues on which it enjoys a competitive edge over its rivals (Budge &
Farlie 1983, Petrocik 1996, Robertson 1976), while muting the salience of less important is-
sues (Rovny 2012, Rovny 2013). Thus, position blurring aims to distort a party’s reputation or
ideological profile on an issue or dimension with the specific intent to create uncertainty (Lo,
Proksch & Slapin 2016, Rovny 2012, Rovny 2013).
Fig. 7: Expert uncertainty on European integration
by party family











Although a modicum of uncertainty is of course inevitable when assessing a party’s
position, the underlying assumption of the position blurring literature is that not all of this
noise is stochastic. Rather, party leaders purposively choose to produce part of this uncer-
tainty (Bräuninger & Giger 2018, Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Han 2018). And, given the
prevalence of multidimensionality in European politics and its ensuing salience differen-
tial across different issues, this approach should not be exclusive to a subset of parties or
countries (Rovny 2012). Indeed, scholars have identified position blurring behavior not only
among the populist radical right (Rovny 2013), but also regionalist parties (Alonso, Cabeza &
Gómez 2015, Basile 2015), and even the political mainstream (Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015).
Looking at the issue of European integration, Figure 7 confirms that expert uncertainty is not
limited to the positions of a subset of parties.24 Mainstream families, such as liberal, social-
24Expert uncertainty is measured using the 1999-2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk
et al. 2017).
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ist, and Christian democratic parties, show lower degrees of expert uncertainty than the greens
and radical left, but considerable variation also exists within all these groups of parties.
How do parties blur?
The above section makes clear that in an increasingly unpredictable and multidimen-
sional political environment, party leaders may have compelling incentives to obfuscate their
policy stances. But how is position blurring achieved? This section develops a theoretical
framework to explore systematically the different strategies that parties employ to produce un-
certainty, and it formulates specific hypotheses about their predicted use and effectiveness. A
useful starting point for identifying the key strategies available to a party is Rovny’s oft-cited
definition, which states that “position blurring can [. . . ] appear as either a lack of a position,
as concurrent multiplicity of positions, or as positional instability over time” (2013, 6). Thus,
one can distinguish between three distinct strategies: avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation.25
I discuss each of these strategies in more detail below.
Avoidance. First, a party can simply try to evade an issue that it considers too risky
and contentious. This is arguably the way in which observers most commonly approach po-
sition blurring. A party might be concerned about an issue’s polarizing potential, as it could
internally divide the party and its (potential) supporters. The example of the British Conserva-
tive Party in 1997, introduced earlier, certainly fits the bill here. The leadership was concerned
about infuriating the party’s Europhiles and therefore adopted a “best not mentioned” strat-
egy (Bale 2006). Similarly, during the first few decades of its existence, the Scottish National
Party (SNP) shunned clear position taking on economic issues, worried that a more outspo-
ken agenda could endanger its demand for independence (Newell 1998). Indeed, the party
was sidelined in the late 1970s, following ideological factionalism over its center-left identity
(Lynch 2002). So, avoidance is a party’s initial attempt to prevent developing a clear profile
on issues outside of its core agenda on which it could be vulnerable.
25It should be noted that this is not necessarily meant to be an exclusive list. For example, a party could be
intentionally vague in its commentary on a contentious issue. To the extent that this behavior is not covered by
the specified strategies, it is difficult to operationalize and gauge empirically.
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Ambiguity. Second, a party can create uncertainty about its profile by taking up am-
biguous, or inconsistent, positions on an issue. By sending out mixed signals, it can attempt to
placate different party and voter groups, and preserve the coalition’s unity. In fact, an ambigu-
ous strategy could potentially serve as a two-pronged approach, meant not only to keep all
factions on board, but also to reach out to new voters. Consider, for instance, the Dutch Chris-
tian Democrats’ (CDA) 2012 proposal to implement a flat tax in the Netherlands. This reform
would simplify the current tax system and promote economic growth, which was expected
to resonate with its more right-leaning supporters. Yet, simultaneously, the party acknowl-
edged that this system is often associated with increased income inequality, which would
undoubtedly fuel concern among leftist voters. To deflect such criticism, the party therefore
suggested a flat tax with an additional “solidarity levy” on wealthier individuals to promote
burden sharing—two measures that are at best an unusual fit, if not mutually exclusive, and
would likely lead to uncertainty about the CDA’s economic profile. Yet, by adopting language
that could prime and galvanize opposing ideological camps, it might actually serve to broaden
the party’s electoral appeal (see also Somer-Topcu 2015).
Alternation. Third, as opposed to ambiguity, which concerns concurrent inconsistency,
a party can distort its profile by frequently shifting its position on an issue over time. This
strategy is reminiscent of ideological zigzagging, as identified by Budge (1994), which can
be used to appease the various internal factions fighting for dominance within a party. Al-
though ‘flip-flopping’ is typically assumed to tarnish a party’s reputation and trustworthiness
(Bernhardt & Ingerman 1985), at times it might go unpunished and actually benefit a party
or candidate. For example, President Trump recently reversed course when he announced his
support for a continued United States military presence in Syria, continuing a pattern of oscil-
lation on foreign policy that dates back to his presidential election campaign.26 Although one
might reasonably expect that alternating between isolationist and hawkish policy preferences
would harm President Trump’s approval ratings, recent research suggest that he is shielded
from such a negative outcome through voters’ partisanship and entrenched political attitudes
26See also “Here’s another way Trump is different: Flip-flopping doesn’t affect his public approval,” The
Washington Post, March 12, 2019.
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(McDonald, Croco & Turitto 2019). Thus, temporal positional inconsistency is expected to
produce uncertainty about a party’s platform, including in the context of European politics.
The above strategies all intend to lead to the same outcome, namely positional uncer-
tainty. I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation increase expert uncertainty
about a party’s position.
Position blurring is not uniformly adopted across the party system, however, as its de-
sirability and feasibility vary by party. For one, more established parties are likely unfit to
blur, because their “long-standing histories, organizational apparatuses, core constituencies,
and well-entrenched ideological images” prevent them from doing so (Rovny 2013, 6). This is
why, for instance, populist radical right parties have a competitive edge over their mainstream
rivals, as they lack both a well-defined reputation and a hierarchical organization in which ac-
tivists could obstruct the party’s agenda-setting process. Consequently, I argue that additional
hypotheses need to be formulated about the use and effectiveness of each strategy.
First, one would expect that distorting one’s reputation through avoidance is partic-
ularly effective for a party that has not yet built a strong public image on an issue. I identify
three characteristics that are likely to increase a party’s overall exposure, making avoidance
less likely to be a worthwhile strategy. Specifically, older parties have had more time to con-
struct an explicit and broader platform, whether purposively or not; larger, more successful
parties tend to receive more attention from opponents, the media, and voters alike, and will
find it harder to prevent clear position taking; and government parties need to formally pro-
pose, support, and implement a policy agenda, which makes position blurring far more diffi-
cult, if not impossible.
Hypothesis 2: Party age, size, and government status condition the effect of
avoidance on expert uncertainty about a party’s position.
With regard to an ambiguity strategy, the examples of the Torries and Labour dis-
cussed in the introduction suggest that (1) established parties are not hampered in their at-
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tempts to broadcast inconsistent policy statements, and (2) ambiguity can still produce uncer-
tainty about a party’s position on an issue. However, I do expect that other moderators con-
dition the effectiveness of this strategy, namely intra-party characteristics and ideological ex-
tremism.
To start with the latter, although inconsistent, contradictory statements are still pro-
grammatic in nature, which means that it is necessary to account for a party’s ideological po-
sition in the political landscape. Specifically, I expect that a party with a more pronounced,
or extreme, platform can create uncertainty more effectively through ambiguity. Compared
to a more moderate party, its inconsistent statements are more likely to be diametrically op-
posed instead of a sign of ideological centrism, which increases uncertainty about its position.
Alternatively, it is possible that a more extremist party is constrained in the extent to which
it can reasonably release conflicting statements, but this would limit the use, not necessarily
the effectiveness, of an ambiguity strategy. Next, this strategy is less likely to be effective for
a leadership-dominated party, because (1) its leaders are less constrained in their behavior, as
activists lack the influence to shape the party’s course, and they can therefore more unilater-
ally determine party policy, and (2) given the leadership’s powerful position, experts are less
likely to encounter mixed statements from party officials and, if they do, these will not carry
sufficient weight to truly create uncertainty about a party’s profile. Relatedly, increased inter-
nal dissent is likely to lead to more ambiguity, because different factions are competing for
dominance and need to be appeased, and part of this struggle over party policy will be played
out in public. Thus, internal dissent is expected to increase the conditional effect of ambiguity
on expert uncertainty.
Hypothesis 3: Ideological extremism, leadership-dominance, and internal dissent
condition the effect of ambiguity on expert uncertainty about a party’s position.
Lastly, existing research suggests that a party experiences important constraints when
trying to alter its positional appeals, especially on an issue or dimension that it considers more
salient (see Chapter 2). As both position blurring and party change are more commonly ob-
served on a party’s secondary dimension, salience will most likely be the main driving force
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behind the use and effectiveness of an alternation strategy.
Hypothesis 4: Salience conditions the effect of alternation on expert uncertainty
about a party’s position.
The combined expectations of hypotheses 2-4 about the conditional effect of avoid-
ance, ambiguity, and alternation on expert uncertainty are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Overview of hypothesized conditional relationships
Age Size Government Extremism Leadership Dissent Salience
Avoidance X X X
Ambiguity X X X
Alternation X
To disentangle position blurring, this study focuses on the issue of European integra-
tion. This approach has several advantages. First, the continued transfer of political author-
ity away from national governments poses a challenge to all member states of the European
Union and, subsequently, this issue has permeated all national party systems. It has become
an important part of how parties campaign for votes. Second, European integration is not eas-
ily integrated into the dominant European political oppositions, especially compared to issues
such as redistribution or immigration. Indeed, scholars continue to debate whether questions
related to the European project can be subsumed into the existing dimensions of political con-
flict (e.g. Bakker, Jolly & Polk 2012, Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002), which makes it more
likely that a party sees the issue as potentially contentious and risky. So, European integration
presents a salient but relatively independent issue that can be analyzed in isolation, including
the party strategies employed to address it. Third, exactly because of the above considera-
tions, multiple existing studies on parties’ attempts to manipulate the dimensionality of politi-
cal contestation have focused specifically on how European integration might be exploited for
that cause (e.g. De Vries & Hobolt 2012, Hobolt & De Vries 2015, Van de Wardt, De Vries
& Hobolt 2014). Fourth, focusing on a single issue allows for a more fine-grained evaluation
of positional inconsistency. It can be difficult to separate centrism from intentional blurring in
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certain contexts (Massetti & Schakel 2015), but expressing both positive and negative state-
ments in one’s platform on a specific issue like European integration is seemingly contradic-
tory and, thus, meaningful.
Data & method
To analyze the use and effectiveness of parties’ blurring strategies, I combine data
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017), or CHES, and the
MARPOR manifesto project (Volkens et al. 2015). This provides me with information about
more than three hundred party-wave observations from 1999-2017 across the following four-
teen democracies in Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.27
To measure the dependent variable, uncertainty about a party’s position on European
integration, I follow the operationalization employed by Rovny (2012, 2013), who uses the
standard deviation in expert placements to gauge positional uncertainty. CHES invites experts
to position each party in their respective country on multiple policy issues and ideological
dimensions, including European integration. The average value among the experts is subse-
quently used as an estimate of a party’s position (from 0-10).28 Although not a perfect mea-
sure, the degree of uncertainty (or disagreement) among experts provides a valid proxy for
the effectiveness of position blurring strategies—and, assuming that experts are the most in-
formed observers, a relatively cautious one.
Figure 8 presents the density distribution of the dependent variable across all obser-
vations. The plot makes clear that there is considerable variation in the degree of expert un-
certainty about party positions on European integration. The substantial variation in expert
uncertainty warrants further exploration and explanation.
27The 2017 CHES wave includes a limited set of countries (France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
28This is a recoded scale of the original survey item, which asks respondents about the party leadership’s
overall orientation towards European integration, ranging from “1 = strongly opposed” to “7 = strongly in favor.”
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Of the three key independent variables, which concern parties’ blurring strategies,
avoidance and ambiguity are measured using data from the MARPOR comparative mani-
festo project. This dataset codes quasi-sentences of a party platform using a total of 56 cat-
egories to evaluate which issues it devotes attention to (Volkens et al. 2015). The decision to
use party manifestos has two advantages. First, these platforms are strategic documents, writ-
ten by party officials with the distinct purpose to outline a party’s message on their own terms
(Bräuninger & Giger 2018). This means that if no discussion is included about a party’s posi-
tion on a certain issue, or only in ambiguous and inconsistent terms, we can assume it to be a
conscious decision, thus increasing the likelihood that we are gauging party strategy. Second,
the combination of party information from two different sources with distinct data generation
processes, expert surveys and manifestos, makes it more difficult to find strong relationships
between my dependent and independent variables. Put differently, the adopted research de-
sign presents a conservative test of this study’s predictions, increasing my confidence in the
accuracy of its findings.
Avoidance, the extent to which a party evades the issue of European integration, is
measured directly by using the MARPOR coding scores.29 These provide an indication of
whether a party covers this issue in its manifesto, and to what degree, as a percentage of its
whole platform. I invert this scale so that higher scores indicate more avoidance, ranging from
29European integration = (per108+per110).
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0 to 100.
Ambiguity, which maps whether a party takes up inconsistent issue positions, can-
not be operationalized as straightforwardly. Yet, by focusing on the above MARPOR issue
cluster, which includes positive and negative mentions of the European Community/Union,
I can evaluate how a party talks about this particular policy area. Specifically, I employ a ra-
tio of the positive and negative categories of the European issue cluster, where the greatest
value is used as the denominator to ensure that the ratio runs from 0-1. The variable is set at
0 otherwise, i.e. when a party makes exclusively positive or negative statements about Euro-
pean integration, or does not discuss the issue at all. I do not account for the salience of the
cluster here, because (1) experts are expected to evaluate a party’s position on European in-
tegration, and its ambiguity, regardless of its overall importance, and (2) a manifesto-based
salience measure would be perfectly collinear with the avoidance variable.
Alternation, the third strategy, requires of measure of temporal ideological flexibility.
I use the change in a party’s position on European integration from one wave to the next, as
reported by CHES. That is, the higher a party’s score, the greater its positional change on Eu-
ropean integration as compared to the previous time point. I do not account for the direction
of a positional shift, because I expect that the magnitude of change is what contributes to ex-
pert uncertainty. The expectation is that more change leads to more uncertainty about a party’s
true position.
Multiple control variables are included that could directly affect expert uncertainty or,
as discussed above, moderate the effect of the different blurring strategies (see also Rovny
2012). A party’s age is the number of years since it was formally founded, at the time of
the survey, as included in CHES. Party size is based on its vote share in the most recent na-
tional election. Government status is a binary indicator variable which records whether a party
was part of a ruling coalition during the previous wave, because cabinet participation is ex-
pected to make position blurring both less desirable and less feasible, as a party relinquishes
at least partial control over its own agenda when in government. Positional extremism reports
a party’s distance from the relative ideological center in a country at time t on the issue of
European integration, which is calculated as the average position across a party system. The
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appeal of extremist parties is their ideological distinctiveness from their rivals, which means
that blurring is less likely. Indeed, a non-centrist platform has been shown to improve the
clarity of a party’s appeals (Dalton 1985). I also include a measure of the internal balance of
power between party leaders and activists (Rohrschneider & Whitefield 2012), with higher
scores indicating more leadership-dominance. Because intra-party disagreement on European
integration could lead to position blurring, I include a CHES item which measures internal
dissent on a 0-10 scale. Finally, I control for the salience of European integration in the party
system as a whole, as a party does not operate in a vacuum and is dependent on its competi-
tors’ issue agendas. I use the same salience measure employed to gauge avoidance to calculate
the average importance of European integration for the party system, excluding a party’s own
score.
Table 12 (Appendix 3.1) presents the descriptive statistics for the included dependent
and independent variables. As seen previously in Figure 8, expert uncertainty ranges from
0-3, with an average of 1.34. The first two blurring strategies have relatively skewed distribu-
tions. Avoidance typically takes on higher values, as most parties devote attention to a lot of
different issues in their platforms, while, for the same reason, the ratio used to measure am-
biguity tends to take on lower values. Alternation runs from 0-5 but, in general, positional
shifts are more limited (average = 0.64). Party age and vote share both vary substantially,
as different types of parties are included in the data. Across all observations, about 40% of
the parties were in government during the previous wave. Extremism has a mean of about
2, but the observed maximum is 6.36. The mean (0.44) and empirical range of leadership (-
0.25,1.00) indicate that more parties are leadership-dominated. Dissent varies between 0-8,
but the mean level of a party’s internal disagreement on European integration is relatively low,
at 2.70. The average of system salience is 3.18, which means that the other parties in a system
devote about 3% of their manifestos to the issue of European integration. Tables 13 and 14
(Appendix 3.2-3.3) provide the correlation matrix for the included variables and descriptive
statistics about the use of each blurring strategy by party group, respectively.
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Analysis
To analyze the position blurring behavior of parties, I run a cross-sectional time series
analysis. A simplified specification of the model can be formulated as follows:
uncertaintyi,t = α + β1avoidancei,t + β2ambiguityi,t + β3alternationi,t +
β3controlsi,t + β4(strategyi,t × controlsi,t) + β5countryt + εi,t
where the dependent variable, uncertainty, is the standard deviation among experts
about a party’s position on European integration; avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation rep-
resent the blurring strategies for party i at time t; the controls include age, vote share, govern-
ment, extremism, leadership, dissent, and system salience, all of which vary both over time
and across parties; the interaction terms gauge the marginal effect of each strategy on uncer-
tainty at different values of the moderating variables; and country-level indicator variables
are included to account for system-level differences. The analyses below are conducted using
Prais-Winsten estimation and include robust standard errors to correct for group-wise het-
eroscedasticity.
First, Model 1 in Table 5 presents the results of a baseline analysis, which includes
all the control variables but none of the interaction terms. As hypothesized, the coefficient
estimates for avoidance (0.018), ambiguity (0.402), and alternation (0.133) are all positive
and statistically significant (at p < 0.05). Given that the independent variables are measured
on different scales, we can calculate that these effect sizes correspond to a positive change of
0.055, 0.096, and 0.080 in expert uncertainty, respectively, for every one standard deviation
increase in each variable. Because the standard deviation in the dependent variable is 0.597,
these estimates are considerable and substantively meaningful. These findings suggest that all
three strategies are effective in creating uncertainty among experts about a party’s position on
the issue of European integration, even when controlling for other factors that might produce
doubt or disagreement about its platform.
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Table 5: Regression analysis of expert uncertainty, 1999-2017
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(baseline) (avoidance) (ambiguity) (alternation)
Avoidance 0.018∗ 0.012 0.016∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Ambiguity 0.402∗ 0.374∗ 1.157∗ 0.425∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.099) (0.057)
Alternation 0.133∗ 0.146∗ 0.145∗ 0.177∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034)
Age -0.003∗ -0.029∗ -0.002∗ -0.003∗
(0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001)
Vote share -0.009∗ -0.025 -0.009∗ -0.010∗
(0.001) (0.063) (0.001) (0.001)
Government -0.041∗ 0.958 -0.040 -0.037∗
(0.018) (0.820) (0.020) (0.019)
Extremism -0.033∗ -0.031∗ -0.041∗ -0.033∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Leadership -0.299∗ -0.287∗ -0.315∗ -0.287∗
(0.074) (0.084) (0.053) (0.069)
Dissent 0.110∗ 0.111∗ 0.136∗ 0.113∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
System salience 0.013∗ 0.011 0.008 0.016∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Salience -0.011
(0.006)
Avoidance × Age 0.000∗
(0.000)
Avoidance × Vote share 0.000
(0.001)
Avoidance × Government -0.010
(0.008)
Ambiguity × Extremism 0.149∗
(0.038)
Ambiguity × Leadership -0.513∗
(0.233)
Ambiguity × Dissent -0.254∗
(0.033)
Alternation × Salience -0.016
(0.010)
Constant -0.308∗ 0.241 -0.172 1.434∗
(0.408) (0.914) (0.374) (0.069)
N 312 312 312 312
Wald 1518.70 2799.74 61838.69 1441.49
Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients corrected for panel-level heteroscedasticity
with country indicator variables (not shown here) and robust standard errors (in parentheses).
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05.
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Turning to the included control variables, the coefficients for party age, size, govern-
ment status, extremism, and party organization are also statistically significant, but they are
all negative. In other words, experts are typically more certain about the positions of parties
that are older, larger, in government, more extremist, and leadership-dominated—which is in
line with my expectations. Internal dissent about European integration increases expert un-
certainty, as predicted. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, higher system salience leads to more
uncertainty among experts as well, but this finding could be the product of the variable’s op-
erationalization, which excludes the importance of the issue to a party itself. This could mean
that, as European integration becomes more salient to the other parties in a system, experts
become relatively less certain about the position of a party which does not devote as much
attention to this issue as its competitors.
With regard to the subsequent hypotheses, are the observed positive relationships be-
tween the blurring strategies and expert uncertainty on European integration, indeed, condi-
tional? Models 2-4 in Table 5 shed light on this question by expanding the baseline model to
include the interaction terms between the three strategies and the specified control variables.
First, I theorized that avoidance is less likely to be an effective blurring strategy for parties
with more established reputations, including older, larger, and government parties. Although
the presented results provide a preliminary indication of these relationships, which are largely
identical to the baseline model, the preferred way to interpret the included interaction terms
is by means of marginal effects plots. Figure 9 displays the marginal effect of avoidance on
expert uncertainty at different values of the three moderators. Contrary to my expectations,
the marginal effect of avoidance increases as a party becomes older. Although the confidence
intervals are wider at the higher end of the x-axis, due to the limited number of observations,
the positive relationship is nevertheless statistically distinguishable from zero. This suggests
that older parties are not necessarily limited in their use of an avoidance strategy and can thus
still create uncertainty about their position. With regard to party size and government status,
however, panels (b) and (c) provide support for my predictions. That is, the marginal effect
of avoidance on expert uncertainty is no longer statistically significant for parties with a vote
share greater than 23%, which entails about a quarter of my sample, as the confidence inter-
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vals encompass zero. Furthermore, the marginal effect loses about half of its magnitude when
comparing government parties to those in opposition, which means that taking on executive
responsibilities does limit the extent to which a party can obfuscate its position on European
integration through avoidance.30














































































Next, Model 3 in Table 5 examines the conditional effect of ambiguity on expert un-
certainty. The displayed coefficient estimates are nearly identical to the baseline model but,
as before, the marginal effects plots are of particular interest. To reiterate, the expectation is
that a party’s ability to blur on European integration by making inconsistent statements on
the issue is moderated by its degree of ideological extremism, leadership-dominance, and in-
ternal dissent. Figure 10 provides mixed results. First, although expert uncertainty decreases
as a party becomes more extreme (see Model 3, Table 5), the marginal effect of ambiguity
increases as a party moves away from the ideological center. In other words, experts are typ-
ically more certain about the position of an extremist party, most likely because it improves
its distinguishability from its rivals, which makes inconsistent statements all the more pow-
erful for creating disagreement. Moreover, while mixed messaging of a centrist party could
be a reflection of its moderate position on an issue, this is not the case for parties that operate
on the fringes of the political spectrum. Second, as expected, an ambiguous strategy is less
30One might expect that the weakened marginal effect of avoidance on expert uncertainty for especially larger
and government parties is simply the product of the reduced utilization of this particular strategy among this
subset of parties. However, older, larger, and government parties are not less likely to use an avoidance strategy
(see Figure 21, Appendix 3.4). The same is true when looking at the direct relationships between this strategy
and the three control variables—their bivariate correlations are 0.08, 0.10, and 0.07, respectively (see Appendix
3.2). In other words, the reduced marginal effect of avoidance on expert uncertainty observed in Figure 9 does
not result from the limited use of this strategy, but from its limited effectiveness.
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effective for a party dominated by the leadership, as experts can more easily identify whose
messaging carries most weight within a party. They are less likely to be confused by incon-
sistent positions. Third, increased dissent on European integration reduces the marginal effect
of ambiguity on expert uncertainty. This is perhaps unexpected, as the direct relationship be-
tween dissent and uncertainty is consistently positive and statistically significant. This can be
interpreted to mean that internal dissent does not make its way into a party’s manifesto, which
is a strategic document that a party purposively drafts to shape its message. Rather, internal
disagreement is more likely to become public through speeches, interviews, and the like. In-
deed, given that the marginal effect of ambiguity is higher among activist-dominated parties,
this could indicate that parties with more internal democracy and shared decision-making are
more likely to be internally divided.
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(c) Dissent
Finally, Model 4 in Table 5 examines the conditional effect of alternation on expert
uncertainty. Because my measures of salience and avoidance are perfectly collinear, I do not
include the first blurring strategy in this model. The results are highly similar to the previous
models. As expected, salience has a negative coefficient estimate, albeit not statistically sig-
nificant, which suggests that expert uncertainty decreases when the issue of European integra-
tion becomes more important to a party. Figure 11 presents the marginal effect of alternation
on expert uncertainty at different values for salience. As European integration becomes more
salient, the marginal effect of alternation decreases, and is no longer statistically significant
at a value greater than six. In line with extant work (see Chapter 2), this is the result of party
change becoming relatively less likely when an issue, or dimension, becomes more salient to a
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party and its supporters. Thus, an alternation strategy is only appropriate, and effective, when
the given issue is not very important to a party.
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Discussion
This study presents an analysis of the position blurring strategies employed by parties
in Western Europe. I have shown that avoidance, ambiguity, and alternation all increase ex-
pert uncertainty about party positions on European integration. Their effect is conditional on
party-level characteristics, however. (1) Avoidance is less effective for larger and government
parties; (2) ambiguity can be used especially by activist-dominated and extremist parties in
order to increase uncertainty, and (3) the effect of alternation decreases as an issue becomes
more salient to a party.
The findings presented here suggest that party positions are not always clearly delin-
eated, as is typically assumed in the party competition literature. The study sheds light on, and
helps us understand, how parties present themselves to voters in a political environment that
is undergoing dramatic changes. Party competition is increasingly volatile, unpredictable, and
multidimensional, giving party leaders compelling incentives to adopt blurring strategies in an
attempt to appease different internal factions, to reach out to new voters, or to prevent alienat-
ing current supporters.
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Nevertheless, the observed patterns in party behavior do not necessarily mean that po-
sition blurring is an effective tool to alleviate discord among party members or supporters.
Future research will need to study whether internal party disagreement and party switching
by disgruntled voters can actually be assuaged, if not prevented, through position blurring.
So far, evidence suggests that it very well might (Rovny 2012, Somer-Topcu 2015). Further-
more, in-depth interviews with party leaders could provide us with a better understanding of
the strategic incentives behind their actions. Case studies could help unpack party leaders’
motivations and the intra-party decision-making processes that lead to position blurring be-
havior.
Although this paper has focused on the advanced industrial democracies of West-
ern Europe, the phenomenon of position blurring is not exclusive to countries with a history
of programmatic politics. For example, parallels can be drawn to the political platforms of
the authoritarian leaders that are driving the illiberal turn in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g.
Fidesz in Hungary and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland. Their fixation on issues like
nationalism, xenophobia, and a fierce opposition to the European Union means that they can
purposively mute and avoid any concrete policy proposals that could sway, or alienate, sup-
porters, echoing the strategic rationale behind position blurring efforts. Thus, position blurring
is arguably best conceptualized as a continuum, and future research will have to unpack its
implications for the study of regime types.
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CHAPTER 4: LEFT-RIGHT DIVERSITY AMONG REGIONALIST PARTIES
All over Europe we see the continued dispersion of authority away from national gov-
ernments (Hooghe & Marks 2003). Not only is power relocated to the transnational level,
most prominently to the European Union, the decentralization of political authority to sub-
national governments is equally significant. Consequently, with both subnational and supra-
national layers being created or strengthened, government structures are becoming increas-
ingly complex and polycentric (Caporaso 1996, Ostrom 2010, Rodden 2004). Moreover,
just as European integration has become increasingly politicized over the years (Hooghe &
Marks 2009), not least due to the rise of Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant challengers, regional
governance has taken center stage in many European democracies because of the recent suc-
cesses of regionalist parties (Jeffery 2009, Jolly 2015). Whether it is the consolidation of the
Scottish National Party as a major force in British politics, culminating in the 2014 refer-
endum on Scottish independence, or the contentious and ongoing political conflict over the
status of Catalonia in Spain, the significance of regionalist parties for European politics can
hardly be overstated. National and regional identity questions will continue to crucially in-
form the preferences of voters and politicians alike, posing new challenges for the European
Union and European integration.
Our understanding of regionalist parties is limited, however. Despite their shared de-
mand for increased self-government, they show a remarkable level of diversity on the eco-
nomic left-right dimension (De Winter 1998, De Winter & Gomez-Reino 2002, Henceroth
& Jensen 2018). Where most other party families are characterized by a high degree of ideo-
logical congruence, regionalists span the entire political spectrum, from more leftist parties
in Scotland, Spain, and Wales, to their more right-wing counterparts in Belgium and Italy
(Mazzoleni, Mueller & Van Haute 2017, Mair & Mudde 1998). To illustrate this, Figure 12
compares the ideological positions of European regionalist parties to those of four statewide
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party families in a two-dimensional policy space.31 The green, social democratic, conserva-
tive, and Christian democratic party families all show strong cohesion in the policy positions
of their members, but the regionalist parties depicted in panel (b) are strikingly diverse and
located across the two constituent axes.
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How can we explain the ideological diversity within the regionalist party family?
Specifically, what factors shape a regionalist party’s positions outside of its core agenda?
This study answers that question by analyzing the economic appeals of European regionalist
parties. Adopting a dimensional approach, I argue that their left-right positions are the prod-
uct of both short-term strategic considerations and long-term structural constraints. On the
left-right dimension, which is less salient, or secondary, to the party and its supporters, a re-
gionalist party will be able to behave more strategically than on its primary center-periphery
dimension. However, it still faces constraints from the environment in which it finds itself. I
test, and find partial evidence for, the following hypotheses: (1) a regionalist party initially
avoids the left-right dimension, as it only stands to lose from adopting an outspoken economic
agenda, but over time this becomes increasingly undesirable and infeasible; (2) once a region-
alist party does engage with the left-right dimension, its position is relatively more flexible
than its appeals on core issues related to the center-periphery cleavage; and (3) a regionalist
31Party positions are taken from the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and distinguish between
an economic left-right and a cultural GAL-TAN dimension (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017), where GAL-
TAN stands for Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist.
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party’s left-right position reflects the ideological complexion of ‘its’ region as compared to the
country as a whole.
Because regionalist parties are limited in number and geographical span, with exam-
ples found in a select number of European countries, comparative data can be hard to come
by. As a result, most existing work in the field of regional politics is based on individual case
studies. This study provides one of the first attempts to comparatively and systematically an-
alyze the left-right positions of European regionalist parties (see also Massetti & Schakel
2015). It draws from a variety of datasets, including the Expert Survey on Ethnonationalism
in Party Competition (Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Szöcsik & Zuber 2018), the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017), and the MARPOR manifesto project (Volkens
et al. 2015). A brief discussion of the economic profile of the Scottish National Party is pre-
sented to provide a more in-depth examination of this study’s predictions.
This paper has important implications for the study of regional politics and democracy.
Exactly because regionalist parties are the main political driver behind this push for increased
autonomy and, when granted, will play a crucial role in shaping the economic policies of the
regions they represent, it is essential to understand their ideological positions. The increased
attention for economic issues could indicate that regionalist parties are expanding their ap-
peals, but it could also signal an attempt to amplify their opposition on the center-periphery
dimension by exploiting other lines of political conflict. Finally, this study contributes to a
growing literature about the strategic behavior of parties in a multidimensional environment.
The ideological profile of the regionalist party family
What constitutes the policy platforms of European regionalist parties? Before we
can answer that question, it is worth considering whether this set of parties truly represents
a ‘party family.’ Although intra-group diversity is inevitable with any categorization, some
observers have noted that the stark differences between regionalist parties belie their clas-
sification as a family (Mair & Mudde 1998). Yet, despite their differences, it is justifiable
to study regionalist parties as a unit, a distinct subset of the vast variety of political parties
found across the European continent (Fagerholm 2016). First, the similar historical origins
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of regionalist parties have created strong commonalities in their organization and sociol-
ogy (Rokkan 1970, Von Beyme 1985). They are the political representatives of the center-
periphery cleavage, a conflict born out of the lasting opposition between the urban, state-
building elites and those who advocate for the territorial interests of the outer regions (Lipset
& Rokkan 1967). Second, regionalist parties are united in their core mission to achieve, en-
hance, and protect self-governance for ‘their’ region (De Winter 1998). The raison d’être of
these parties is certainly to advance the interests of their subnational constituents, typically by
advocating for greater political decision-making at a level closer to the citizens.
As a result of these similarities, an extensive literature studies the nature, causes,
and consequences of regionalist party development and behavior, including their electoral
success (Brancati 2008, Deschouwer 2009, Gordin 2001, Van Haute & Pilet 2006). The
common denominator among these parties, their regionalist agenda, has been equally scru-
tinized (Massetti 2009, Newman 1997). As one might expect, variation exists in regional-
ists’ demands for self-rule, as the nature and viability of their claims are context-specific.
A region’s identity, and its distinctiveness from the rest of the country, can be based on lan-
guage (e.g. South Tyrol or Ticino), cultural history (e.g. Catalonia), civic as opposed to eth-
nic attributes (e.g. Scotland), it can even be socially constructed (e.g. Padania) (Mazzoleni
& Mueller 2017). Massetti & Schakel (2016) identify different gradations of radicalism in
their core platforms. While some parties are relatively moderate by campaigning for cultural
protectionism or limited regional autonomy, others can be qualified as truly separationist,
challenging the unity of the existing state. Similarly, Van Houten (2000) focuses on a party’s
degree of ‘regional assertiveness’ in requesting, for example, that its region be granted the
power to levy its own taxes, independent of the national government’s allocation of resources.
Regardless of their shared agenda for regional autonomy, regionalist parties do engage
with issues beyond those related to the center-periphery cleavage. Like any of their competi-
tors, regionalists do not operate in a vacuum, but rather find themselves in an increasingly
multidimensional, fluid, and unpredictable political landscape (Knutsen 2005, Thomassen
2005). Despite claims to the contrary (e.g. Meguid 2005, Henceroth & Jensen 2018), region-
alist parties are not necessarily ‘niche’ actors. They are neither single issue parties, nor do
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they take up radical or extremist positions. Scholars have studied, for instance, how these
parties position themselves on issues such as immigration (Hepburn 2009) or European in-
tegration (De Winter & Gomez-Reino 2002, Jolly 2007). There is a growing attention and
appreciation for regionalist parties’ diverse and expansive issue appeals, and their ability to
act strategically in an attempt to strengthen or broaden their support base (Elias, Szöcsik &
Zuber 2015, Rovny 2015).
The economic left-right dimension, the ideological divide most pivotal to European
political contestation, has received less attention in the regionalism literature, and so has the
variation in the policy positions of regionalist parties on this continuum. Indeed, as discussed,
the lack of intra-family uniformity is remarkable and not easily explained by a single indicator
(Massetti 2009). The next section develops a theoretical framework to explain the positions
and strategic behavior of this party family on economic issues.
The economic left-right dimension
How do regionalist parties engage with the economic left-right dimension? I argue
that, to fully appreciate their strategic behavior, we need to account for the multidimensional
nature of the policy space in contemporary European democracies (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson
2002, Inglehart 1990, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi et al. 2012). In a multidimensional environment,
parties encounter a multitude of issues and dimensions, some of which are less important to
them and their supporters (Meguid 2005, Meguid 2008). As a result, parties can choose not
to adopt a single, identical strategy across the board. Rather, party strategy is dependent on
salience (see Chapter 2), and parties have multiple strategies to choose from when encounter-
ing issues outside of their core agenda (Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015). Like all parties, region-
alists are expected to be more entrenched on their primary dimension, the center-periphery
cleavage, on which they enjoy durable and self-enforcing ties with their constituents (Hooghe
& Marks 2018). This rootedness produces relative positional constraint and inflexibility, as
the risks of compromising these linkages with their most loyal supporters outweigh any short-
term electoral gains (Adams et al. 2006).
Building on recent insights from the party competition literature (e.g. Elias, Szöcsik &
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Zuber 2015, Rovny 2015), this study assumes that the left-right dimension is less salient, or
secondary, to many regionalist parties, and that this has important ramifications for their be-
havior. Strategic behavior is both more feasible and more desirable. Specifically, I formulate
the following three hypotheses: (1) a regionalist party initially avoids the left-right dimension,
as it only stands to lose from adopting an outspoken economic agenda, but over time this be-
comes increasingly infeasible and undesirable; (2) once a regionalist party does engage with
the left-right dimension, its position will be relatively more flexible than its appeals on core
issues related to the center-periphery cleavage; and (3) a regionalist party’s left-right position
reflects the ideological complexion of ‘its’ region as compared to the country as a whole. I
discuss each of these predictions in more detail below.
First, while scholars have highlighted the strategic potential of a new line of politi-
cal conflict when challenging the status quo (Carmines & Stimson 1986, Hobolt & De Vries
2015, Riker 1986, Van de Wardt, De Vries & Hobolt 2014), others have suggested that par-
ties are best served by emphasizing the issues that they own or enjoy a competitive advantage
on (Budge & Farlie 1983, Petrocik 1996, Robertson 1976). Just as it could internally divide
one’s competitors and their supporters, expanding a party platform to new issues, and taking
clear positions on them, brings considerable risk. It might alienate future voters or coalition
partners, who do not agree with all of a party’s positions, but it could also create internal rifts
within a party’s current ranks.
Accordingly, one might ask why a regionalist would decide to expand its agenda at all.
Rather, it may have an incentive to blur its position on secondary issues to prevent bringing
such internal disagreements to the fore (Rovny 2012, Rovny 2013). For a regionalist party,
given that no clear relationship exists between its demand for regional autonomy and conven-
tional, mainstream political issues (see Figure 12), an obfuscation strategy on the economic
left-right dimension may be preferable (Alonso, Cabeza & Gómez 2015, Basile 2015). Fol-
lowing Chapter 3, an avoidance strategy seems particularly appropriate, as regionalist parties
are typically smaller in size and destined to be in the opposition, which increases the effec-
tiveness of this strategy in producing uncertainty. This leads to a first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A regionalist party will initially avoid the economic left-right di-
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mension.
While avoidance of the left-right dimension might be appropriate strategy in the early
stages of a regionalist party’s development, it is not without limits. It is difficult to completely
and consistently dismiss such a fundamental and ubiquitous dimension of political contesta-
tion for any party, and it is nearly impossible not to provide a more comprehensive plan of the
type of society a regionalist party aims to promote in the long run. It faces systemic pressures
from statewide parties to do so (Massetti & Schakel 2015). Moreover, a party leaves itself
vulnerable to attacks from competitors on both sides of the political spectrum (Newell 1998).
Thus, eventually, a regionalist party is expected to move away from an avoidance strategy, but
how will it subsequently behave on the left-right dimension?
Given the lower salience of economic issues to a regionalist party, party change is
more likely (see Chapter 2). Fewer constraints exist that limit its strategic behavior, exactly
because a regionalist party is less rooted on its secondary dimension. Positional shifts will be
less risky and more appealing from a strategic perspective (Adams et al. 2006).
Hypothesis 2: A regionalist party’s position on the economic left-right dimension
will be more flexible than on issues related to the center-periphery cleavage.
But which factors determine the actual economic left-right position that a regionalist
party eventually takes up? Echoing the belief that we cannot only focus on Downsian strategic
considerations, we also need to study the Rokkanian constraints on party behavior (Chapter
2, see also Rovny 2015). A party is closely tied to its core constituents and these linkages are
perpetuated and reinforced over time, as voters, members, and activists are recruited through
its primary cleavage (Hooghe & Marks 2018). This means that, unless a new line of political
conflict is cross-cutting existing ones, the preferences of their supporters on other issues are
likely to be taken up by a party as well, especially if a region’s ideological complexion is part
of its regional identity. That is, a party will be inclined to emulate the general policy prefer-
ences of their supporters on issues outside of their core agenda to maintain the strong, reliable
linkages with its most loyal supporters.
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Massetti & Schakel (2015), for instance, find that a region’s relative economic strength
shapes the left-right profile of a regionalist party (see also Van Houten 2000). Relatively rich
regions are expected to have a rightist regionalist party, while left-wing parties are projected
to emerge in relatively poorer regions. The causal relationship between these two factors can
be outlined more directly, however. I argue that a regionalist party’s position on the left-right
dimension should reflect the relative economic preferences of its regional supporters. Thus, a
regionalist party will be constrained by the ideological complexion of the region it represents,
especially in relation to the country as a whole. This strategy is reminiscent of a subsuming
strategy, which aims to frame secondary issues in such a way that they directly translate to its
primary dimension (Elias, Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Rovny & Edwards 2012). This leads to my
final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: A regionalist party’s position on the economic left-right dimension
will reflect the ideological complexion of the region it represents, as compared to
the country as a whole.
Data availability
The hypotheses presented here at tested using a combination of different datasets.
First, to analyze the ideological positions of regionalist parties, I use the Expert Survey on
Ethnonationalism in Party Competition (Szöcsik & Zuber 2015, Szöcsik & Zuber 2018),
which covers more than twenty countries across Europe and spans two waves (2011 and
2017). Crucially, it provides expert evaluations of regionalist party positions on a variety
of items, including left-right and issues related to regional autonomy.32 Second, I rely on
the 1999-2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey to compare regionalists’ ideological positions
to those of their statewide competitors, especially on the economic left-right dimension
(Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017). Third, the salience of economic issues to regionalist
parties is measured using the MARPOR manifesto project, which provides classifications of
party platforms on the basis of a coding scheme that consists of 56 issue categories (Volkens
32The main variable used here is eco m for parties’ left-right position.
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et al. 2015). Finally, average voter positions, both national and regional, are taken from the
European Social Survey, using respondents’ left-right self-placement scores.
Due to a number of issues related to a low N, data availability and comparability, and
missing data, this paper focuses on a limited number of cases. There are a finite number of
regionalist parties in Europe, some of which are small and either do not compete in national
elections or do so with limited success. As a result, the available number of observations is
relatively low. In order to provide the most extensive results possible, different sets of parties
are analyzed throughout this study.
Countries that are consistently included here are Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, but some analyses are extended to include other democracies in Western Europe.
The temporal dimension is by and large limited to 1999-2017, but the MARPOR manifesto
project allows me to conduct a few exploratory analyses that span multiple decades. In order
to allow for both generalizing observations and a more fine-grained analysis of the idiosyn-
crasies of individual cases, I alternate between datasets for each hypothesis and present multi-
ple empirical results, as well as an in-depth case study of the Scottish National Party.
Analysis
This section presents the results for each of my three hypotheses. To test my first hy-
pothesis, that a regionalist party initially avoids the left-right dimension, I first compare the
degree to which regionalist parties evade economic issues compared to other statewide party
families. To test this expectation, I gauge the shares (in percentages) of regionalist parties’
manifestos that are devoted to the left-right dimension, as reported by MARPOR (see Ap-
pendix 4.1).33 I then use an inverted scale, ranging from 0 to 100, to measure avoidance, with
higher scores indicating fewer mentions of economic issues.
Figure 13 shows that regionalist parties are more likely to avoid the economic left-
right dimension than their competitors. In fact, only greens and the radical right adopt an




that, on average, its members only devote about a third of their platforms to economic issues.
For most mainstream party families, this statistic falls within a range of 50-60%.
Fig. 13: Avoidance of left-right (MARPOR, 1999-2017)
by party family










Alternative indicators of position blurring can be explored, however. As outlined in
Chapter 3, avoidance is a blurring strategy aimed at producing uncertainty. But is this method
effective? Building on the operationalization employed by Rovny (2012, 2013), we can also
use the standard deviation in CHES expert placements to gauge positional uncertainty. Al-
though not a perfect measure, it provides a conservative proxy of voter uncertainty, as experts
are assumed to be the most informed observers. Moreover, the 2017 CHES survey includes
an item about the clarity of a party’s position on the economic left-right dimension (0-10),
with higher scores indicating higher lucidity. Figure 14 corroborates the findings presented
above. Panel (a) shows that, as before, there is considerable uncertainty about regionalist par-
ties’ economic profiles. Similarly, panel (b) confirms that their positions on left-right are rela-
tively opaque, as experts rank them third behind the radical right and, perhaps surprisingly, the
Christian democrats.
Next, to track whether the regionalist party’s attention for economic issues is indeed
increasing over time, I again use data from the MARPOR manifesto project. As discussed, the
strategy of avoidance can logically be expected to wane over time, as regionalist parties ulti-
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Fig. 14: Position blurring on left-right (CHES)
by party family










(a) Expert Uncertainty (1999-2017)











mately will have to propose and clarify what type of economic policies they envision for their
respective region. Panel (a) of Figure 15 plots these left-right avoidance percentages of re-
gionalist parties’ manifestos from the late 1940s onwards.34 Although I do not control for any
potential covariates here, we can nevertheless observe a clear, generally downward trend over
time, meaning that regionalist parties increasingly devote attention to the left-right dimension
in their platforms.
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34For comparison, only parties of European Union member states are included here.
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However, as this scatterplot is merely looking at individual time points and does not
track the ideological trajectories of regionalist parties over time, panel (b) presents the degree
to which a left-right avoidance strategy was adopted by fifteen regionalist parties included
in multiple CHES waves, from 1999-2017.35 Although the timeframe is limited, one can ob-
serve an incremental decline in the degree to which these parties avoid the left-right dimen-
sion. This suggests that they diversify their platforms over time to include more mentions of
economic issues. Most likely this is the product of the increased strategic importance of left-
right for their regionalist agenda, and the difficulty of consistently avoiding a dimension so
ubiquitous and pivotal to general political contestation.
To explore my second hypothesis, Figure 16 compares positional shifts across dif-
ferent party families and dimensions. To reiterate, the expectation here is that a regionalist
party faces relatively few constraints when attempting to change its position on left-right,
thus producing more flexibility, as compared to core issues related to their regional autonomy
agenda. First, panel (a) compares party change from time t−1 to t by party family, as reported
by CHES (1999-2017). Here, we see that regionalist party positions on left-right are not more
flexible. That is, the magnitude of their positional changes is not larger than those of other
party families. Focusing on the regionalist party family alone, the EPAC survey allows us to
compare the positional shifts of regionalist parties across four different dimensions, all on a
0-10 scale, between 2011 and 2017.36 The first of these is the dimension of interest, left-right,
while the other three are related to the center-periphery cleavage, namely (1) ethnonation-
alism, (2) cultural autonomy, and (3) territorial autonomy (see Appendix 4.2 for full survey
questions).
Panel (b) presents the separate boxplots of party change across the four ideological di-
mensions. Given that the West-European policy space has proven more structured and durable
than its non-Western counterpart, the plots are separated by region. Indeed, party change tends
35The included parties are N-VA, FDF (Belgium), SFP/RKP (Finland), SF (Ireland), LN, SVP (Italy), CiU,
PNV, EA, ERC, BNG, CC, CHA (Spain), SNP, PC (United Kingdom).
36The countries included here are Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom in Western Europe. Non-
West European countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Roma-
nia, Serbia, and Turkey.
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to be vastly lower in the West. Turning to individual party change across the four dimensions,
it is noteworthy that positional shifts on left-right are by no means less common. In fact, in
the West, only party change on ethnonationalism is slightly more substantial than left-right
positional shifts, while both of these are considerably more likely than party change on the
cultural and territorial autonomy dimensions. However, extant research suggests that the rela-
tive salience of these dimensions needs to be taken into account, as this could moderate party
change (see Chapter 2).37 Outside of Western Europe, left-right party change is virtually tied
with two of the regional dimensions, but its scores are considerably more spread out and sig-
nal more extreme positional changes on the economic dimension.
Fig. 16: Party change on left-right
by family & dimension










(a) By family (CHES, 1999-2017)




Cultural autonomy Territorial autonomy
(b) By dimension (EPAC, 2011-2017)
While not conclusive by itself, this could provide support for my second hypothe-
sis. After all, one might expect that it is easier for a party to change its position on a single
issue—or for experts to pick up such a (perceived) shift. By contrast, to structurally redirect a
party’s entire economic agenda might be more difficult. Yet, despite the added complexity and
multifacetedness of the left-right dimension, party change seems just as likely here as on the
three items of regional autonomy.
Finally, to test my third hypothesis, I analyze the actual positions of regionalist par-
37Indeed, for regionalist parties, the salience of the left-right dimension is more normally distributed, and less
skewed, than for the issues related to regional autonomy (see Appendix 4.3). Consequently, positional shifts on
this dimension become more likely as its salience decreases. This relationship between party change and salience
is observed less, if at all, on regionalist parties’ core dimensions.
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ties on the economic left-right dimension. As parties start to abandon the avoidance strategy
on this dimension, what position do they eventually take up, and where are they located rela-
tive to the position of the national and especially the regional voter? Figure 17 plots twenty-
four regionalist parties included in EPAC (2017), with the x-axis and y-axis representing each
party’s absolute ideological distance to the mean national and regional voter, respectively.38
The dashed line represents a situation in which a party is perfectly equidistant from the two
voter positions.
As can be seen from Figure 17, all but six of the included parties are positioned be-
low the dashed line, which means that they are located closer to the regional voter than the
national voter on the left-right dimension. This suggests that, in line with my third hypothe-
sis, regionalist parties tend to adopt the economic preferences of their regional supporters. In
other words, the constraints posed by the relative position of the regional voter seem to pre-
vent a regionalist party from fully adopting a strategic median voter strategy on the left-right
dimension, as that would produce shorter distances to the position of the respective average
national voter in each country.
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38The included countries are Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Lithuania.
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While the plotted differences may appear small, it is important to note that both the
regional and national voter positions are simple averages that cover a high number of respon-
dents; respondents with starkly different ideological views. As a result, the empirical range
of these variables is limited. The positions of regionalist parties, on the other hand, do vary
considerably and cover a wider range. Thus, although the distances between parties and voters
can be substantial, the fact that 75% of the included observations are positioned closer to the
regional voter than the average national voter is a meaningful finding.
As an illustrative example, and to look more closely at this dynamic, Figure 18 plots
the actual positions of nine regionalist parties, as well as the regional and national voters, on
the economic left-right dimension in four prominent countries.39 In all the cases shown here,
the regionalist party is positioned on the side of the regional voter. In other words, if the ide-
ological complexion of a region is more leftist (rightist) than the country as a whole, the re-
gionalist party can also be expected to be left-wing (right-wing). This, again, suggests that
parties come to represent the ideological preferences of their region on the secondary dimen-
sion, too, instead of adopting a more vote-maximizing, median voter strategy. While not all
cases are shown here, this finding seems to hold for most of my observations.
Fig. 18: Regionalist party and voter positions on left-right (EPAC, 2017)











Party position Regional voter National voter
39Here, the nine parties represent Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
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Finally, it is interesting to note that there is not only considerable variation in left-right
positions among regionalist parties in general, the starting point of this paper, but also within
regions. It seems that regionalist parties are aware of the importance of being ideologically
distinguishable from their rivals, even on a less salient, secondary dimension, and will subse-
quently take up either a more moderate or a more extreme position than their regionalist com-
petitor(s). For instance, while the NV-A in Flanders (Belgium) may have adopted more mod-
erate stances than VB on the cultural dimension, its economic profile is certainly more outspo-
kenly right-wing. Furthermore, the SVP, which has long represented the region of South Tyrol
in Italy, has a fairly centrist position on left-right, whereas its new challengers (STF and BU)
are considerably more economically right-wing.
The case of the Scottish National Party
To provide a more in-depth illustration of the above findings, this section presents a
concise discussion of the Scottish National Party’s ideological profile, and how it has changed
over time, as it pertains to the three hypotheses of this study.
Although the Scottish National Party (SNP) was established almost ninety years ago, it
is only recently that the party has truly taken center stage in British politics. Since the start of
devolution, when a Scottish Parliament was established, the SNP’s hold on power has steadily
grown, culminating in the 2014 referendum on the independence of Scotland from the United
Kingdom. While the defeat by about ten percentage points could have been interpreted as a
decisive blow to the ambitions and existence of the party, its membership numbers have ac-
tually seen a dramatic surge since the public voted to remain within the union (Bennie 2017).
Its rise further materialized in the 2015 United Kingdom general election, when the party won
all but three of the constituencies in Scotland and secured 50% of the Scottish vote. Thus, far
from losing ground after the lost referendum, the SNP remains a force to be reckoned with in
British politics.
But how has the SNP been able to consolidate and strengthen its position in Scotland?
And, specifically, how has it garnered such widespread support among a diverse electorate? In
fact, during the first few decades of its existence, the SNP was considered by many to be more
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like a political movement than a party, including by some of its leaders (Lynch 2002). Its chief
goal was to promote Scottish self-government, and different electoral strategies and alliances
were explored to achieve that end. Other issues received little attention, if any, as an internal
struggle played out about whether the party should fight for autonomy through incremental
change, e.g. devolution, or only be satisfied with full-fledged independence.
This exclusive focus on self-government meant that even the economic dimension was
avoided, as “the [SNP] was reluctant to develop a clear image on the conventional left-right
issues—which were only indirectly related to independence but which could compromise that
goal by threatening internal unity” (Newell 1998, 111). This strategy of avoidance remained
in place until the late 1960s, and led its opponents to mockingly claim that SNP was an initial-
ism for ‘Still No Policies’ (Lynch 2002, 7). Thus, the SNP had to make a tough decision: It
could publically declare itself to be social democratic, taking on Labour in its electoral heart-
land, or remain relatively non-ideological in an effort to compete with the Conservative Party.
Eventually, the former strategy won out. The party’s economic profile became more
explicitly center-left, and further crystallized during the Thatcher era (Mitchell 1996, Mitchell,
Bennie & Johns 2012). The ideological contrast with its major statewide competitors only be-
came starker still, when Labour moved to the center under the more pragmatic leadership
of Tony Blair in the 1990s. This is not to say that the SNP’s economic profile has been pro-
nounced and unambiguous since the 1970s. Ever concerned about the risk of alienating po-
tential Scottish voters, the party continued to alter its left-right appeals, leading to an overall
‘flexible’ position on this dimension (Lynch 2002, Newell 1998). Its continued effort to main-
tain a moderate economic course was justified, as the history of the SNP is rife with internal
conflict that could jeopardize party unity and, presumably, an ideological shift in any direc-
tion aimed at maximizing the party’s vote share was just as likely to weaken its support base
(Finlay 2016).
Nevertheless, despite the party’s avoidance of economic issues and its subsequent
strategic behavior on left-right, little doubt seems to have existed about its ultimate location
on this dimension. And the same is true for the economic preferences of the average Scot-
tish voter. “From the outset, the choice was less about whether the SNP should be left- or
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right-wing, which would have been resolved in favor of being on the left simply through force
of numbers, but rather about whether it should appeal across social classes to the nation as
a whole or whether it should tailor its appeal to the working classes or at least progressive
forces. While one view held that it was necessary to avoid being a single-issue party and re-
quired policies on a broad range of issues, another view was that the party should seek to
maximize its support by avoiding placing itself firmly on the leftright spectrum” (Mitchell,
Bennie & Johns 2012, 14).
The type of national identity prominent among Scottish voters is an important deter-
minant of the SNP’s economic profile. Although the commonly employed dichotomy between
civic and ethnic nationalism is arguably too stark, Scottish nationalism is certainly more civic
in nature (Lynch 2002, Mitchell, Bennie & Johns 2012). In its history, the party has made few
ethnic appeals about common ancestry or language. Rather, its push for self-government is
focused on Scotland, not Scots, and emphasizes its contrasting policies and institutions on
issues like citizenship, multiculturalism, and immigration from the other parts of the United
Kingdom, especially England.
To conclude, with regard to the hypotheses outlined in this study, the SNP’s profile on
the economic dimension strongly conforms to my expectations. First, for decades, the party
consciously avoided left-right issues out of fear of alienating voters that would otherwise sup-
port their movement for Scottish autonomy. Second, even after taking up more defined eco-
nomic positions, the SNP continued to alternate its left-right appeals in the hopes of appeasing
different ideological factions within the party. Third, the SNP was constrained by, if not des-
tined to follow, the largely social democratic attitudes of their constituents, not least because
the civic nature of Scottish nationalism is strongly based on a more progressive identity com-
pared to the rest of the United Kingdom.
Discussion
Despite their shared agenda for regional autonomy, regionalist parties show a remark-
able degree of intra-party family diversity on the economic left-right dimension. This paper
provides one of the first attempts to systematically analyze and explain this variation. I have
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argued that we need to adopt a multidimensional approach to fully appreciate the behavior
of regionalist parties across issues and dimensions that are more or less salient to them. Par-
ties encounter and approach ideological dimensions with varying levels of urgency and this
is important for understanding their strategic actions. With regard to regionalist parties, I find
evidence that they (1) initially tend to avoid economic issues; (2) eventually do engage with
the left-right dimension, but their positions are relatively more flexible than their appeals on
core issues related to the center-periphery cleavage; and (3) their actual positions reflect the
ideological complexion of ‘their’ regions as compared to the country as a whole.
Depending on data availability, the analyses presented here need to be extended and
provide a promising avenue for future research. In particular, it is crucial to understand why
regionalist parties decide to move away from an avoidance strategy on the left-right dimen-
sion. When is it that economic issues become strategically of interest to these parties? This is
one of the key questions that will need to be explored further. Furthermore, although the theo-
retical expectations outlined above should apply to all regionalist parties, a possible condition
that could undermine these hypotheses is the presence of another regionalist party in the re-
gion. Preliminary evidence does seem to suggest that this is an important consideration. If a
regionalist competitor is already present, a new challenger might deem it necessary to adopt
more extreme, or even opposite, economic positions in an attempt to make itself ideologically
distinguishable from its rival(s).
The hypothesized and observed patterns should translate beyond the scope of this
study in two ways. First, regionalist parties’ blurring behavior, and their eventual position tak-
ing, should apply to issues beyond the left-right dimension as well. On the cultural GAL-TAN
dimension, in particular, these parties are arguably just as likely to build a profile that reflects
the relative ideological complexion of their constituents. Second, although this study’s focus
was on parties that represent a specific geographical region, the same logic should apply to
any party that represents a distinct group of voters, such as ethnic minority parties. Future re-
search will have to test whether this is indeed the case.
This paper has important implications for the study of regional politics and party com-
petition. Not only does it provide a specific test of party behavior in the context of multidi-
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mensionality, it also contributes to our understanding of the (strategic) appeals of regionalist
parties and the way in which they attempt to reach out to their supporters, including on issues
unrelated to their primary dimension. These insights are valuable, not least for explaining the
behavior of other niche and challenger parties in advanced liberal democracies in Europe and
beyond.
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APPENDIX 2.1: CATEGORIZATION OF MARPOR ISSUE AREAS
Table 6: MARPOR issue areas (left-right, GAL-TAN)
# Issue category Dimension
401 Free market economy Left-Right
402 Incentives Left-Right
403 Market regulation Left-Right
404 Economic planning Left-Right
405 Corporatism/mixed economy Left-Right
406 Protectionism (positive) Left-Right
407 Protectionism (negative) Left-Right
408 Economic goals Left-Right
409 Keynesian demand management Left-Right
410 Economic growth (positive) Left-Right
411 Technology and infrastructure Left-Right
412 Controlled economy Left-Right
413 Nationalization Left-Right
414 Economic orthodoxy Left-Right
415 Marxist analysis (positive) Left-Right
504 Welfare state expansion Left-Right
505 Welfare state limitation Left-Right
506 Education expansion Left-Right
507 Education limitation Left-Right
701 Labor groups (positive) Left-Right
702 Labor groups (negative) Left-Right
104 Military (positive) GAL-TAN
105 Military (negative) GAL-TAN
106 Peace GAL-TAN
107 Internationalism (positive) GAL-TAN
108 European community (positive) GAL-TAN
109 Internationalism (negative) GAL-TAN
110 European community (negative) GAL-TAN
201 Freedom and human rights GAL-TAN
202 Democracy GAL-TAN
305 Political authority GAL-TAN
416 Anti-growth economy (positive) GAL-TAN
501 Environmental protection (positive) GAL-TAN
601 National way of life (positive) GAL-TAN
602 National way of life (negative) GAL-TAN
603 Traditional morality (positive) GAL-TAN
604 Traditional morality (negative) GAL-TAN
605 Law and order GAL-TAN
606 Civic mindedness GAL-TAN
607 Multiculturalism (positive) GAL-TAN
608 Multiculturalism (negative) GAL-TAN
705 Underprivileged minority groups GAL-TAN
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APPENDIX 2.2: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INCLUDED VARIABLES
Table 7: Correlation matrix (Chapter 2)
Change Change Sal. Vote Govt. Dist. Dist. Age Party.
L-R G-T share part. L-R G-T org.
Change L-R 1.00
Change G-T 0.19 1.00
Salience -0.04 -0.03 1.00
Vote share 0.09 -0.01 0.27 1.00
Govt. part. -0.04 -0.00 0.22 0.23 1.00
Dist. L-R -0.14 0.08 0.05 -0.16 -0.13 1.00
Dist. G-T 0.18 0.08 -0.34 -0.25 -0.14 -0.00 1.00
Age -0.14 -0.03 0.14 0.36 0.10 -0.05 -0.41 1.00
Party org. 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.32 0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 1.00
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APPENDIX 2.3: ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONALIZATIONS
One way to check the robustness of my findings is by using a series of alternative op-
erationalizations of the main variables of interest. First, the dependent variable can be oper-
ationalized differently. I use MARPOR’s own left-right and GAL-TAN coding of manifesto
issue categories to map parties’ positions on the two ideological dimensions.40 As before, a
party’s score on the dependent variable is the absolute change in its position between time
points. Table 8 presents the output of this analysis.




Vote share -.032* -.061*
(.007) (.009)
Government participation -1.248* .980*
(.100) (.190)




Party organization 1.370* 2.087*
(.206) (.755)
Salience × vote share .342* -.028
(.021) (.058)
Salience × govt. participation -6.865* 2.704*
(.374) (1.162)






Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients corrected for
panel-level heteroskedasticity and standard errors (in parentheses).
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
40Left-right = (per401+per402+per407+per414+per505) - (per403+per404+per405+per406+per409+
per412+per413+per415+per416+per504);
GAL-TAN = (per104+per109+per601+per603+per605+per608) - (per105+per106+per107+per501+
per503+per602+per604+per607+per705).
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For the sake of comparison, I employ the same measure of salience as in my main
analysis. The results confirm that a negative relationship exists between salience and party
change. That is, as the relative importance of the economic dimension increases, party change
on left-right decreases while on GAL-TAN it increases. It should be noted that only the co-
efficient estimate for salience on the left-right dimension is statistically significant, but this
relationship needs to be explored in more detail given the included interaction terms.
Second, I introduce another measure of the independent variable. As an alternative to
manifesto data, I employ party-level salience items included in CHES to measure the impor-
tance of each ideological dimension.41 Table 9 shows the results of an analysis that uses this
alternative operationalization of the independent variable; the other components of the model
are identical to the one in the main paper. The relevant salience items were only included in
the 2014 CHES wave, so the number of observations is lower than before and there is no time
series dimension to the data. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates for each model, again,
have the appropriate signs. Briefly put, as a dimension’s salience increases, party change de-
creases. This time, however, the coefficient estimate for salience is only statistically signifi-
cant on the GAL-TAN dimension.
41The included items are lrecon salience and galtan salience.
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Table 9: Regression analysis of absolute party changes (CHES), 1999-2014
Left-Right GAL-TAN
Salience (CHES) -.678 2.538*
(.623) (1.215)
Vote share .004 -.003
(.005) (.006)
Government participation -.046 .101
(.106) (.122)




Party organization .129 .365
(.231) (.250)
Salience × vote share .002 -.017
(.036) (.045)
Salience × govt. participation .242 -1.342
(.637) (.794)






∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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APPENDIX 2.4: PARTY CHANGE ON DIMENSIONS VS. ISSUES
Table 10 compares party change on the left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions, pre-
sented earlier, to three specific items included in CHES related to European integration. The
three items measure change in the party leadership’s support (1) for European integration in
general, (2) for the powers of the European Parliament, and (3) for the EU’s foreign and se-
curity policy. Crucially, the mean and standard deviation are very similar across all items, de-
spite the fact that the EU-specific questions are measured on an alternative 7-point scale that
ranges from “Strongly opposed” to “Strongly in favor”. This is reassuring, because these find-
ings suggest that the relative stability in party positions observed and explained in this paper is
unlikely to be the product of the adopted dimensional approach.
Table 10: Party change on dimensions vs. issues
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Change Left-Right 0.502 0.461 0.000 3.059
Change GAL-TAN 0.595 0.508 0.000 2.900
Change European Union 0.406 0.388 0.000 2.900
Change European Parliament 0.503 0.453 0.000 2.790
Change Foreign policy 0.496 0.446 0.000 2.550
Finally, an additional way to check the robustness of this paper’s findings is by ana-
lyzing the actual relationship between party change and salience for these specific items. This
is possible because CHES includes a question on the relative salience of European integra-
tion for a party’s public stance, measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (“not important”) to 10
(“most important”). As before, the expectation is that positional change on these EU-specific
issues is less likely as European integration becomes more salient to a party. Figure 19 graphs
party change on the European Union and its foreign policy by the salience of European inte-
gration for non-governmental parties.42
42The two only clear outliers, the Liberal Alliance in Denmark (2014) and Syriza in Greece (2006) with
scores of 2.3 and 2.9, respectively, are not shown in graph (a).
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Even when not accounting for party size or ideological extremism, we nevertheless
observe a negative relationship between the party-level salience of European integration and
positional change, both with regard to support for the EU in general and its foreign and secu-
rity policy. In other words, the party leadership’s position on these specific issues is less likely
to change over time as the overall salience of European integration increases. This is in line
with my expectation and further lends credence to the findings of this paper.
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Similarly, Figure 20 depicts the relationship between party change and salience for six
individual policy areas that are encompassed by the aggregate ideological dimensions used
in my primary analysis, left-right and GAL-TAN. The specific issues are (1) tax policy, (2)
deregulation, (3) redistribution, (4) social lifestyle, (5) immigration, and (6) multicultural-
ism.43 Government parties are once again excluded here.44 In line with both my main find-
ings and the above Figure 19 on parties’ EU-related stances, positional change is less likely
when an issue’s salience is high. This relationship holds true for all policy areas, despite not
controlling for the size and ideological extremism of a party. The results of this robustness
43The CHES items survey a party’s position and salience on “improving public services vs. reducing taxes”,
“deregulation of markets”, “redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor”, “social lifestyle (e.g. homosexu-
ality)”, “immigration policy”, and “integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimila-
tion)”, respectively.
44A common y-axis is used across all graphs to allow for direct comparison. As a result, the following obser-
vations are not shown here: LAOS in Greece (2010, graph (a) tax policy), PVV in the Netherlands (2010, graph
(b) deregulation), and SVP in Italy (2014, graph (f) multiculturalism).
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check confirm the findings of this paper and suggest that the hypothesized relationship be-
tween party change and salience applies to both ideological dimensions and individual policy
issues.
















































































APPENDIX 2.5: PARTY CHANGE AS A RATIO
The main analysis of this paper studies the relationship between party change and
salience separately for each ideological dimension. An alternative approach would be to di-
rectly compare party change on left-right and GAL-TAN by using a ratio between the two
as the dependent variable in my model, similar to my main independent variable measuring
salience. This specification is not ideal, because it assumes that party behavior is uniform
across the two dimensions, which we know not to be true—party change is slightly more fre-
quent and substantial on the less coherent cultural dimension. However, a ratio of change does
account for the possible correlation between party positions across the two dimensions, and
allows me to further test the validity of my findings.






where a positive score indicates that a party moved more on left-right than on GAL-
TAN from t−1 to t, and vice versa. Given the same independent variable as before (salience),
we would expect a clear negative relationship between x and y. That is, as the relative salience
of left-right to GAL-TAN issues increases, the ratio of party change should decrease, which
means more movement on GAL-TAN than left-right. Conversely, a decline in salience should
produce an increase in the ratio of party change.
Table 11 presents the results of this analysis. Because a party’s distance from the ide-
ological center varies for each dimension, this control variable and its interaction term are
omitted here. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on salience once again
confirm my findings. As the relative ‘primariness’ of a dimension increases, party change be-
comes less likely.45 Furthermore, the marginal effect of salience is not statistically significant
45Another way to account for the possible dependence between party change on left-right and GAL-TAN
would be to use “seemingly unrelated regression”. This method is ill-suited to handle the temporal dimension of
the data, however, leading to distorted standard errors. Nevertheless, this method also produces similar signs for
the coefficient estimates of interest.
78
for government parties (not shown here), confirming that participation in government greatly
conditions party behavior.












Salience × vote share .013*
(.002)






Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients corrected for
panel-level heteroskedasticity and standard errors (in parentheses).
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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APPENDIX 3.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INCLUDED VARIABLES
Table 12: Descriptive statistics (Chapter 3)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expert uncertainty 1.34 0.60 0.00 3.15
Avoidance 96.88 3.04 74.25 100.00
Ambiguity 0.13 0.24 0.00 1.00
Alternation 0.64 0.61 0.00 4.83
Age 51.49 39.28 4.00 176.00
Vote share 14.27 11.96 0.15 45.40
Government 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Extremism 2.18 1.46 0.03 6.36
Leadership 0.44 0.23 -0.25 1.00
Dissent 2.70 1.50 0.00 8.00
System salience 3.18 1.70 0.13 9.83
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APPENDIX 3.2: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INCLUDED VARIABLES
Table 13: Correlation matrix (Chapter 3)
Uncer. Avoid. Ambig. Altern. Age Vote Govt. Extr. Lead. Diss. Sys. sal.
Uncertainty 1.00
Avoidance 0.18 1.00
Ambiguity 0.25 -0.02 1.00
Alternation 0.32 0.10 0.07 1.00
Age -0.30 0.08 -0.05 -0.15 1.00
Vote share -0.27 0.10 -0.07 -0.13 0.34 1.00
Government -0.09 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 0.24 1.00
Extremism -0.27 -0.21 -0.05 -0.16 -0.03 0.01 -0.20 1.00
Leadership -0.23 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 0.32 0.02 0.24 1.00
Dissent 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.11 -0.31 -0.12 1.00
System sal. 0.03 -0.27 0.04 0.06 -0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05 1.00
81
APPENDIX 3.3: BLURRING STRATEGIES BY GROUP
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of blurring strategies
Variable Group Mean Median 25% - 75%
Avoidance
Age Young 96.34 97.13 94.95 98.88
Old 97.11 97.68 96.21 99.03
Size Small 96.95 97.67 95.98 98.95
Large 97.68 97.83 96.93 98.98
Government Out 96.68 97.28 95.60 98.81
In 97.15 97.66 96.48 98.84
Extremism Low 96.93 97.51 96.05 98.55
High 95.79 96.64 94.42 98.55
Leadership Low 97.40 97.50 95.98 99.05
High 96.09 97.47 95.38 98.40
Dissent Low 95.93 96.93 95.38 98.11
High 97.56 97.97 96.66 99.05
Ambiguity
Age Young 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.22
Old 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.05
Size Small 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.25
Large 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.11
Government Out 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.22
In 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.08
Extremism Low 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.15
High 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.06
Leadership Low 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.13
High 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.20
Dissent Low 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01
High 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.22
Alternation
Age Young 0.75 0.56 0.21 1.20
Old 0.53 0.38 0.22 0.69
Size Small 0.77 0.55 0.21 1.28
Large 0.55 0.37 0.22 0.71
Government Out 0.73 0.53 0.25 1.06
In 0.58 0.40 0.18 0.79
Extremism Low 0.80 0.63 0.31 1.26
High 0.59 0.35 0.19 0.80
Leadership Low 0.68 0.54 0.26 1.04
High 0.58 0.36 0.24 0.82
Dissent Low 0.51 0.32 0.13 0.74
High 0.86 0.61 0.36 1.25
Note: The different groups represent the bottom and top 25% on each variable.
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APPENDIX 3.4: AVOIDANCE BY PARTY TYPE
Fig. 21: Avoidance of European integration















































APPENDIX 4.1: CATEGORIZATION OF MARPOR ISSUE AREAS (L-R)
Table 15: MARPOR issue areas (left-right)
# Issue category Dimension
401 Free market economy Left-Right
402 Incentives Left-Right
403 Market regulation Left-Right
404 Economic planning Left-Right
405 Corporatism/mixed economy Left-Right
406 Protectionism (positive) Left-Right
407 Protectionism (negative) Left-Right
408 Economic goals Left-Right
409 Keynesian demand management Left-Right
410 Economic growth (positive) Left-Right
411 Technology and infrastructure Left-Right
412 Controlled economy Left-Right
413 Nationalization Left-Right
414 Economic orthodoxy Left-Right
415 Marxist analysis (positive) Left-Right
504 Welfare state expansion Left-Right
505 Welfare state limitation Left-Right
506 Education expansion Left-Right
507 Education limitation Left-Right
701 Labor groups (positive) Left-Right
702 Labor groups (negative) Left-Right
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APPENDIX 4.2: EPAC SURVEY QUESTIONS
• Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties at one end
of the spectrum, want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties at the
other end of the spectrum, emphasize a reduced economic role for government: priva-
tization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare
state. (eco)46
• In multinational states, parties may have different positions on the status of ethno-
national groups and the nature of the state. At one end of the spectrum (0), majority
nationalists seek hegemony within the current state they define as their nation-state.
At the other end of the spectrum (10), minority nationalists seek to become the hege-
monic majority in a new nation-state. Moderate parties of the middle ground (5) seek a
common state in which no single ethno-national group dominates over another. (ethno)
• In multinational states, parties may have different positions on cultural autonomy for
national minorities, defined as the right to establish institutions of self-government in
the fields of education and culture. At one end of the spectrum (0), parties are strongly
against granting cultural autonomy to national minorities. At the other end of the spec-
trum (10), parties are strongly in favor of granting cultural autonomy to national minori-
ties. (cul)
• In multinational states, parties may have different positions on territorial autonomy for
national minorities, defined as the right to establish their own institutions of regional
self-government within their traditional homeland territories. At one end of the spec-
trum (0), parties are strongly against granting national minorities territorial autonomy.
At the other end of the spectrum (10), parties are strongly in favor of granting national
minorities territorial autonomy. (ter)
46Question taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015, Polk et al. 2017).
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APPENDIX 4.3: DIMENSIONAL SALIENCE & LEFT-RIGHT PARTY CHANGE









0 2 4 6 8 10
Salience
Left-Right Ethnonationalism
Cultural autonomy Territorial autonomy















Adams, J. 2001. Party Competition and Responsible Party Government: A Theory of Spatial
Competition Based upon Insights from Behavioral Voting Research. Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press.
Adams, J. 2012. “Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty
Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence.” Annual Review of Political Sci-
ence 15:401–419.
Adams, J., L. Ezrow & Z. Somer-Topcu. 2011. “Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters
Do Not Respond to European Parties’ Policy Statements During Elections.” American
Journal of Political Science 55(2):370–382.
Adams, J., M. Clark, L. Ezrow & G. Glasgow. 2004. “Understanding Change and Stability
in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?”
British Journal of Political Science 34(4):589–610.
Adams, J., M. Clark, L. Ezrow & G. Glasgow. 2006. “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Dif-
ferent from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of West-
ern European Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998.” American Journal of Political Science
50(3):513–529.
Adams, J. & Z. Somer-Topcu. 2009. “Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival Par-
ties’ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-
Five Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 39(4):825–846.
Adams, J.F., S. Merrill & B. Grofman. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A
Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Alesina, A. & A. Cukierman. 1990. “The Politics of Ambiguity.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105(4):829–850.
Alonso, S. 2012. Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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